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SLOWING THE PACE OF RECOVERY: 
WHY PROPERTY ASSESSED CLEAN ENERGY 
PROGRAMS RISK REPEATING THE 
MISTAKES OF THE RECENT FORECLOSURE 
CRISIS 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Since taking office in 2009, President Obama has stressed the need to 
retrofit America’s buildings with alternative forms of sustainable 
energy.1  Increased reliance on one form of sustainable energy, solar 
power, will conserve fossil fuels and reduce greenhouse gas emissions.2  
Despite the many attractive benefits, homeowners are reluctant to invest 
in solar energy retrofits because of the high upfront cost of installation.3  
To help homeowners overcome these costs, states are experimenting 
with different financing methods.4  Property Assessed Clean Energy 
(“PACE”) programs are one financing method that allow local 
governments to use special assessment districts to finance these home 
installations.5  PACE programs represent the most recent in a long line of 
                                                 
1 See generally MIDDLE CLASS TASK FORCE & COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, 
RECOVERY THROUGH RETROFIT (2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/ 
documents/Recovery_Through_Retrofit_Final_Report.pdf (describing the White House’s 
energy policy). 
2 See Energy Kinetics, Sustainability, SYSTEM 2000, http://www.energykinetics.com/ 
sustainability.shtml (last visited Oct. 15, 2011) (explaining how solar energy can benefit the 
environment). 
3 See Robert C. Barnes, The Promise and Peril of Assembly Bill 811’s Contractual 
Assessments, CAL. REAL EST. J., Jan. 26, 2009, at 14 (reporting that “solar energy 
systems . . . can cost up to $40,000 per installation”).  The average contract in Palm Desert, 
California, was $33,000.  Id.; see also Progress Report, Reality Check:  The Powers That Be, U.S. 
NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 2010, at 27 (reporting that despite a fifty percent drop in price, 
the costs need to drop an additional twenty-five to fifty percent from current levels before 
solar systems will be economical). 
4 See Property-Assessed Clean Energy (PACE) Programs, U.S. DEP’T ENERGY, 
http://www1.eere.energy.gov/wip/solutioncenter/PrintableVersion/financialproducts/p
ace.html (last visited July 28, 2011) (explaining the advantages and disadvantages of PACE 
projects).  Supporters also assert that these programs will increase demand for homes and 
increase home values.  ETHAN N. ELKIND ET AL., SAVING ENERGY:  HOW CALIFORNIA CAN 
LAUNCH A STATEWIDE RETROFIT PROGRAM FOR EXISTING RESIDENCES AND SMALL 
BUSINESSES 14 (May 2010), available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Saving_ 
Energy_May_2010(1).pdf; see also MARK ZIMRING & MERRIAN FULLER, CLEAN ENERGY 
FINANCING POLICY BRIEF:  ACCELERATING THE PAYMENT OF PACE ASSESSMENTS 3 (May 4, 
2010), available at http://eetd.lbl.gov/ea/ems/reports/ee-policybrief_050410.pdf (claiming 
that “energy savings [from solar panel installation] will offset and, in some cases, exceed 
the assessment payments,” thereby reducing the risk of default on the PACE assessment). 
5 Property-Assessed Clean Energy (PACE) Programs, supra note 4; see also Cisco DeVries & 
Christopher Lynch, How Cool:  Changes to Municipal Finance Law Address Global Warming, 
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state and local initiatives, but previous programs have only been met 
with limited success.6 
However, critics have been quick to point out that these programs 
have various legal and financial risks that could repeat the financial crisis 
of 2008.7  In particular, critics argue that these programs are loans instead 
of traditional property assessments.  Since they are not assessments, 
PACE loans are not entitled to a senior lien position ahead of preexisting 
mortgages.8  The resolution of all of these financial and legal challenges 
depends on whether PACE programs can be classified as property tax 
assessments with senior lien status.  In reality, PACE programs are 
actually loan programs, not an extension of the special assessment 
statutory authority.  As such, the tax lien provisions in PACE statutes are 
invalid, and PACE programs are not entitled to a senior lien position 
ahead of preexisting mortgages. 
This Note begins by explaining the history of PACE statutes and the 
controversy surrounding them in Part II.9  Part II also examines the 
                                                                                                             
Create Green Jobs and Promote Energy Independence, 3 BLOOMBERG L. REP. 1, 1 (2010), available 
at http://pacenow.org/documents/Bloomberg%20Law%20Article.pdf (explaining that 
such special assessment districts, or “land-secured finance districts,” could “essentially 
eliminate upfront cost barriers and spread the cost of energy efficiency improvements over 
their useful life”).  PACE programs are also known as Voluntary Environmental 
Improvement Bonds, Energy Loan Tax Assessment Programs, or Energy 
Efficiency/Renewable Energy Contractual Assessment Districts in some states.  SANJAY 
RANCHOD ET AL., THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PROPERTY ASSESSED CLEAN ENERGY (PACE) 
PROGRAMS UNDER FEDERAL AND CALIFORNIA LAW 3 (May 28, 2010), available at 
http://votesolar.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/PHJW-PACE-White-Paper.pdf 
(listing other names). 
6 DeVries & Lynch, supra note 5, at 4.  See generally SHARON STANTON WHITE, 
MUNICIPAL BOND FINANCING OF SOLAR ENERGY FACILITIES (1979) (analyzing the possibility 
of bond financing for solar energy projects in the late 1970s). 
7 See generally Barnes, supra note 3, at 1 (arguing that PACE programs risk creating the 
same conditions that led to the Great Recession); David A. Felt, PACE Loans—Another 
Subprime Mortgage Crisis?, MKT. SOLUTIONS, June 2010, at 1 (arguing that PACE risks 
outweigh benefits).  The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission recently concluded that the 
2008 financial crisis resulted in part from “shoddy mortgage lending.”  Sewell Chan, 
Financial Crisis Was Avoidable, Inquiry Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2011, at A1.  According to 
financial publications, PACE programs represent “a new and potentially devastating shock 
to the mortgage securities markets and the financial system.”  Felt, supra, at 1.  These 
programs “threaten to undermine the already battered mortgage market in the United 
States.”  Id. 
8 Press Release, Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, FHFA Statement on Certain Energy Retrofit 
Loan Programs (July 6, 2010), available at http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/15884/PACE 
STMT7610.pdf [hereinafter July 6, 2010 FHFA Press Release].  A first mortgage or lien on a 
piece of property “has first priority” over subsequent mortgages and liens, so it is senior.  
DAVID A. SCHMUDDE, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO MORTGAGES AND LIENS 113 (2004).  All 
mortgages and liens recorded after this senior mortgage “are called ‘junior’ mortgages.”  Id. 
9 See infra Part II (chronicling the history of PACE programs and explaining why these 
programs are so controversial). 
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theory behind tax liens and municipal bond financing and concludes by 
examining the specific elements of special assessments.10  Next, Part III 
analyzes PACE statutes and ultimately determines that these statutes are 
drastically different from traditional special assessment statutes.11 
Part IV attempts to resolve the controversy between PACE 
supporters and the Federal Housing Finance Agency (“FHFA”) by 
focusing on Maine’s statute.12  Maine’s statute does not conflict with the 
FHFA’s guidelines because it requires PACE programs to impose junior 
liens.13  Therefore, states should amend their statutes to model the Maine 
statute, while at the same time adopting the Department of Energy’s 
(“DOE”) Best Practices Guidelines.14  If states make these changes, 
investors will once again support PACE programs. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
Investors have stopped supporting PACE programs and 
homeowners have not reaped PACE’s benefits because of the uncertain 
tax lien status of PACE statutes.  Part II begins with a general overview 
of PACE programs before analyzing whether recently enacted PACE 
statutes can be classified as valid property assessments.15  Following the 
historical discussion of PACE programs, Part II.B introduces various 
proposals to resolve the controversy.16  Part II.C then examines the PACE 
statutes, the theory behind municipal bond financing, and tax liens.17  
Finally, Part II.D discusses the specific elements of special assessment 
districts.18  PACE statutes’ tax lien provisions are at the heart of the 
controversy surrounding these programs. 
                                                 
10 See infra Part II.D (describing the elements for a valid property assessment lien). 
11 See infra Part III (analyzing whether PACE programs conform to the guidelines for 
valid property assessments). 
12 See infra Part IV (proposing an amended PACE statute). 
13 See infra note 44 (explaining that FHFA lending guidelines prohibit property owners 
from taking out loans with repayment provisions senior to an existing FHFA loan); see also 
infra note 40 (noting that Maine’s statute is the only statute that currently makes PACE 
liens junior to preexisting liens). 
14 See infra Part IV (proposing a model statute). 
15 See infra Part II.A (explaining the theory behind PACE statutes and the reasons why 
these statutes were originally codified). 
16 See infra Part II.B (explaining the FHFA’s objections to PACE programs). 
17 See infra Part II.C (describing the elements of valid property assessments); see also Part 
III (analyzing PACE programs and concluding that they do not meet the requirements for a 
valid assessment). 
18 See infra Part II.D (discussing the legal and financial aspects of tax liens and explaining 
why they are crucial to determining whether PACE programs are valid assessments). 
Sichtermann: Slowing the PACE of Recovery: Why Property Assessed Clean Energy
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011
266 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46 
A. PACE Programs in General 
Local governments currently have statutory authority to use special 
assessment districts, also known as land-secured finance districts, to 
finance a number of public improvements.19  PACE statutes essentially 
amend these preexisting municipal financing statutes to allow 
municipalities to finance home energy improvements.20  To date, more 
than twenty states have enacted PACE statutes in the last three years, 
and many more are considering similar statutes.21  Local governments in 
California and Colorado have had the most success in implementing 
PACE programs.22 
Local governments typically issue bonds to raise revenue.23  Once a 
local government raises money through a bond issue, homeowners who 
                                                 
19 See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 53340(e) (West 2010).  Such special assessment districts 
“are an essential building block of municipal finance . . . used to finance projects including 
street paving, parks, open space, water and sewer systems, and street lighting.”  DeVries & 
Lynch, supra note 5, at 2.  Municipalities also use special assessment districts to finance 
“seismic improvements, geologic hazard abatement and toxic remediation . . . [and] septic 
tank replacement.”  Id. at 4.  Assessments are also used to finance road improvements, 
“bury[] power lines, [and] extend[] public services into neighborhoods.”  JASON COUGHLIN 
ET AL., CLEAN ENERGY FINANCING POLICY BRIEF:  TRANSFERRING PACE ASSESSMENTS UPON 
HOME SALE 2 (Apr. 12, 2010), available at http://eetd.lbl.gov/ea/emp/reports/ee-
policybrief_041210.pdf. 
20 See DeVries & Lynch, supra note 5, at 4 (explaining that states must slightly modify 
their special assessment district legislation to allow local governments to finance “energy 
efficiency and solar projects on private property”). 
21 The following states have enacted PACE legislation: California, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE 
§ 26100 (West Supp. 2011); Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. § 30-20-606 (2002 & Supp. 2010); 
Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 189.402 (West 2000); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 36-42-3 (2006 & 
Supp. 2011); Illinois, 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-1-11 (Supp. 2011); Hawaii, HAW. REV. STAT. 
§ 46-80 (1993); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. tit. 35A, § 10152 (2010); Maryland, MD. CODE ANN. 
art. 24, § 9-1501 (West 2009); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. § 216C.43 (West 2010); Missouri, MO. 
REV. STAT. § 67.2800 (Supp. 2011); Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. § 271.010 (2011); New 
Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 53-F:1 (2010); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 4-55C-1 
(West 2010); New York, N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 119-gg (McKinney 2009); North Carolina, 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-459 (2009); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5727.75 (West Supp. 
2011); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. tit. 19, § 460.2 (Supp. 2011); Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. § 470 
(2009); Texas, TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 376 (West Supp. 2010); Vermont, VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 24, § 1714(3) (2009); Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-958.3 (Supp. 2011); and 
Wisconsin, WIS. STAT. § 66.0627 (West 2011). 
22 DeVries & Lynch, supra note 5, at 5.  All of Berkeley, California’s slots were filled in less 
than ten minutes, and Palm Desert, California has funded $7.5 million worth of projects.  
Berkeley only made a limited number of slots available to residents and once those slots 
were filled, residents could no longer apply for PACE loans.  Id.  Boulder County, Colorado 
has funded 500 projects by selling $10 million worth of bonds.  Id. 
23 Property-Assessed Clean Energy (PACE) Programs, supra note 4.  While most 
municipalities use special assessment bonds to finance their PACE programs, some, such as 
Palm Desert, California, have used different sources of funds.  Barnes, supra note 3, at 14.  
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wish to take part in the PACE program apply for a loan from the local 
government.24  After receiving the loan, property owners in the 
assessment district repay the cost of the improvement through a senior 
lien on the property.25  This financing method is attractive to 
homeowners because it allows them to install a solar panel without the 
high initial costs.26  Instead of paying for the improvement all at once, 
the homeowner makes incremental payments for several years until the 
entire cost is paid off.27  Local governments collect payments from 
property owners at the same time as property taxes.28  Because PACE 
programs are voluntary, the local government only assesses liens on 
homeowners who choose to take part in the program.29  In addition, the 
                                                                                                             
Palm Desert used its general fund to pay for $2.5 million in PACE contracts, “a fiscal 
luxury that few cities enjoy today.”  Id. 
24 Glen Anderson, Financing Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency, LEGISBRIEF, Aug.–
Sept. 2009, at 1, available at http://www1.eere.energy.gov/wip/solutioncenter/pdfs/ 
NCSL_Property_Tax_Financing_Legisbrief.pdf (explaining that “[r]esidents within these 
districts then can apply for low-interest loans”). 
25 See id. (pointing out that homeowners can repay these loans “through an assessment 
on property taxes or added to the utility bill”); Property-Assessed Clean Energy (PACE) 
Programs, supra note 4 (“The property owners that benefit from the improvement repay the 
bond through property assessments, which are secured by a property lien and paid as an 
addition to the property tax bill.”). 
26 Property-Assessed Clean Energy (PACE) Programs, supra note 4.  PACE programs allow 
homeowners “to install renewable energy equipment or upgrade efficiency at a low 
monthly cost.”  Anderson, supra note 24, at 1.  Additionally, “[t]he work can be completed 
with no upfront costs and usually no increase in cost to the owner, [because] the energy 
savings should be equal to or greater than loan payments assessed to the property tax.”  Id. 
at 1–2; see also RANCHOD ET AL., supra note 5, at 4 (pointing out that many homeowners do 
not make these upgrades because they face prohibitively high upfront costs, and do not see 
any economic benefits until later because the “benefits of energy cost savings are 
distributed over time”). 
27 Property-Assessed Clean Energy (PACE) Programs, supra note 4; see also DeVries & Lynch, 
supra note 5, at 4 (explaining that the homeowner “pay[s] back the costs . . . over a fixed 
period”). 
28 See DeVries & Lynch, supra note 5, at 4 (explaining that homeowners pay for the 
improvement “through an addition to their property tax bill”); see also Barnes, supra note 3, 
at 1 (explaining that local governments will use liens to secure these “contractual 
obligations”); Joel B. Eisen, Can Urban Solar Become a “Disruptive” Technology?:  The Case for 
Solar Utilities, 24 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 53, 84 (2010) (explaining that these 
programs allow property owners to reimburse local governments for the upfront costs by 
“adding specified amounts to their property tax bill[]” for a period of years). 
29 See DeVries & Lynch, supra note 5, at 4 (explaining that homeowners “only pay 
additional property taxes if they ‘opt-in,’ and they only pay for the cost of their project”); 
MERRIAN C. FULLER ET AL., GUIDE TO ENERGY EFFICIENCY & RENEWABLE ENERGY 
FINANCING DISTRICTS FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 27 (2009), available at http://rael.berkeley. 
edu/sites/default/files/old-site-files/berkeleysolar/HowTo.pdf (explaining that “a 
particular parcel of property is not assessed unless that property owner ‘opts-in’ and 
applies to participate in the program”); RANCHOD ET AL., supra note 5, at 3–4 (stating that 
“taxes or assessments may be levied only where the property owner has expressly consented 
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lien runs with the land, meaning that if a homeowner sells the property 
before the lien is fully paid, the new homeowner, not the original owner, 
will pay the remainder of the lien.30 
These programs are not only beneficial to property owners, but to 
cities as well.  Cities have used special assessments with senior lien 
provisions to finance local improvements for over one hundred years.31  
In the 1970s, organizations began looking into financing solar 
improvements by issuing municipal bonds.32  However, PACE 
programs, which allow individual property owners to voluntarily opt 
into financing districts, are new and innovative.33  This general overview 
                                                                                                             
to participate in the PACE program”) (emphasis added); Property-Assessed Clean Energy 
(PACE) Programs, supra note 4 (clarifying that the liens only attach to property if property 
owners “voluntarily choose to attach the cost of their energy improvements to their 
property tax bill”). 
30 See DEP’T OF ENERGY, GUIDELINES FOR PILOT PACE FINANCING PROGRAMS 1 (2010), 
available at http://www1.eere.energy.gov/wip/pdfs/arra_guidelines_for_pilot_pace_ 
programs.pdf (explaining that “PACE programs attach the obligation to repay . . . to the 
property, not to the individual borrower”); Property-Assessed Clean Energy (PACE) Programs, 
supra note 4 (“If the property is sold before the end of the repayment period, the new 
owner inherits both the remaining repayment obligation and the financed energy 
improvements.”).  This ensures that the cost of the improvement will be “repaid over the 
useful life of the financed improvements, regardless of who owns the property.”  DeVries 
& Lynch, supra note 5, at 2; see also Anderson, supra note 24, at 1 (noting that since the loan 
is repaid through a tax assessment or a surcharge on utility bills, “the benefits and 
payments stay with the property”). 
31 See generally Guinn v. McReynolds, 170 P. 421 (Cal. 1918) (explaining that tax liens are 
senior to other liens); Spring St. Co. v. Los Angeles, 148 P. 217 (Cal. 1915) (explaining that 
assessments in general are valid, but the one at issue in the case was invalid since it was not 
proportional to the benefits received by the homeowners); German Sav. & Loan Soc’y v. 
Ramish, 69 P. 89 (Cal. 1902) (upholding a state statutory senior lien provision to finance 
street improvements); People ex rel. Griffin v. Brooklyn, 4 N.Y. 419 (N.Y. 1851) (validating a 
state statute allowing a municipality to use an assessment to finance street improvements); 
RANCHOD ET AL., supra note 5, at 3 (listing types of projects financed through special 
assessments and explaining that “[s]uch districts have been a part of municipal finance and 
the tax lien structure for more than a century”); Water, Wastewater & Wetlands:  Betterments, 
MASS. DEP’T ENVTL. PROT., http://www.mass.gov/dep/water/betters.htm (last visited 
Oct. 15, 2011) (explaining that homeowners can take part in these programs to finance 
septic tank improvements). 
32 See generally WHITE, supra note 6, at 2 (listing the types of solar energy improvements 
that could be financed through municipal bonds). 
33 See DeVries & Lynch, supra note 5, at 1 (describing the PACE program as “an 
innovative municipal finance model”); Nick Timiraos, Fannie and Freddie Resist Loans for 
Energy Efficiency, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 25, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB10001424052748704534904575132123115802584.html (describing PACE as “a novel 
financing mechanism”); see also THE NAT’L RES. DEF. COUNCIL ET AL., WHITE PAPER:  
HELPING ACHIEVE ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY AND ENERGY INDEPENDENCE, 
IMPROVING HOMEOWNER CASH FLOW AND CREDIT PROFILE, PROTECTING MORTGAGE 
LENDERS, AND CREATING JOBS 3 (May 3, 2010) (describing these programs as “innovative 
and cost effective”); Todd Woody, Loan Giants Threaten Energy-Efficiency Programs, N.Y. 
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applies to most PACE programs, but several state statutes have unique 
attributes that make their programs significantly different. 
1. State Statutes 
PACE programs are entirely voluntary, but once a homeowner opts 
into the program, most statutes allow local governments to impose a 
property tax assessment on the property.34  Most statutes require 
homeowners to pay this assessment through a lien on the property.35  
Although some proponents claim that these assessments are not loans, 
many statutes specifically refer to PACE financing as a loan.36  Several 
PACE statutes allow homeowners to repay this loan through a surcharge 
on the homeowner’s utility bill as an alternative to assessments and liens, 
                                                                                                             
TIMES (June 30, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/01/business/energy-
environment/01solar.html (describing PACE programs as “innovative”); AIA Urges 
Congress to Save Clean Energy Bond Program, ARCHINNOVATIONS (July 20, 2010), 
http://www.archinnovations.com/news/architecture-practice/aia-urges-congress-to-save 
-clean-energy-bond-program/ (listing the many benefits of this innovative tool). 
34 See, e.g., 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-1-11 (Supp. 2011) (“A municipality may enter into 
voluntary agreements with the owners of property within the municipality to provide for 
contractual assessments to finance the installation of distributed generation renewable 
energy sources or energy efficiency improvements that are permanently fixed to real 
property.”) (emphasis added). 
35 See CAL. STS. & HIGH. CODE § 5898.30 (West Supp. 2011) (“Assessments levied 
pursuant to this chapter . . . shall constitute a lien against the lots . . . of land on which they 
are made . . . .”); COLO. REV. STAT. § 30-20-610 (2002 & Supp. 2010) (explaining that the 
“[a]ssessment constitutes a lien”); OKLA. STAT. tit. 19, § 460.5(C) (2009) (explaining that 
PACE loans “shall constitute a lien”); OR. REV. STAT. § 470.36(2) (2009) (explaining that 
once a homeowner takes out a PACE loan, “[t]he department shall record a lien”); TEX. 
LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 376.008 (West Supp. 2010) (“An assessment imposed under this 
chapter . . . constitutes a lien . . . .”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 3262(c)(2) (2009) (explaining 
that when property is sold “future payments [on PACE loans] shall constitute as a lien”). 
36 See Brief for Plaintiff, California v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, C10-03084 (filed Jul. 14, 
2010), available at http://ag.ca.gov/cms_attachments/press/pdfs/n1951_final_pace_ 
complaint_&_exhibits_(stamped).pdf (arguing that in California, PACE financing uses liens 
not loans).  But see ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 35-A, § 10153.4 (2010) (“‘PACE mortgage’ 
means a mortgage securing a loan made pursuant to a PACE program to fund energy 
savings improvements on qualifying property.”) (emphasis added); OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 470.500(1) (2009) (“The Director of the State Department of Energy shall administer the 
energy efficiency and sustainable technology loan program for the purpose of providing 
financing, promotion and technical support . . . .”) (emphasis added); VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 15.2-958.3(B) (Supp. 2011) (“Any locality may, by ordinance, authorize contracts to 
provide loans for the initial acquisition and installation of clean energy improvements with 
free and willing property owners . . . .”) (emphasis added); Eisen, supra note 28, at 86 
(describing PACE as more like loans). 
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and two statutes even allow for an alternate secondary form of 
repayment known as a Loan Loss Reserve Fund (“Reserve Fund”).37 
The most significant difference between the various state PACE 
statutes is the seniority of the lien:  most statutes require the lien to be 
senior to all other mortgages and liens, just like property taxes.38  
                                                 
37 See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 470.680(3) (2009) (“An energy efficiency and sustainable 
technology loan must provide for repayment through an on-bill financing system 
unless . . . the department and the borrower specify the alternative repayment method in 
the loan agreement.”); VA. CODE § 15.2-958.3(B) (“The locality may combine the loan 
payments required by the contracts with billings for water or sewer charges, real property 
tax assessments, or other billings . . . .”).  Maine’s statute is more open-ended:  “PACE 
assessments do not constitute a tax but may be assessed and collected by the trust, a 
municipality or an agent designated by the trust or a municipality in any manner allowed 
under the PACE program, consistent with applicable laws.”  ME. REV. STAT. tit. 35-A, 
§ 10156.1 (2010).  North Carolina’s statute provides for repayment through a Revolving 
Loan Fund as an alternative method of secondary repayment: 
Financing Assistance— A city may establish a revolving loan fund and 
a loan loss reserve fund for the purpose of financing or assisting in the 
financing of the purchase and installation of distributed generation 
renewable energy sources or energy efficiency improvements that are 
permanently fixed to residential, commercial, or other real property.  A 
city may establish other local government energy efficiency and 
distributed generation renewable energy source finance programs 
funded through federal grants.  A city may use State and federal grants 
and loans and its general revenue for this financing. 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-459.1(b) (2009).  Likewise, Hawaii’s statute provides for a reserve 
fund: 
Reserve funds for payment of improvements. . . .  As used in this 
section, “reserve fund” means any fund established by a county to 
provide security, in addition to any special fund made up of moneys 
collected on account of assessments and interest for improvements, for 
the payment of principal and interest on bonds issued for such 
improvements where moneys in the special fund are insufficient for 
this purpose. 
HAW. REV. STAT. § 46-81 (1993).  The federal grants referenced in the North Carolina statute 
can come from a variety of programs.  One program in particular, the Community 
Development Block Grant (“CDBG”), was championed during the Clinton Administration.  
See Patricia E. Salkin, Smart Growth and Sustainable Development:  Threads of a National Land 
Use Policy, 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 381, 394–95 (2003) (describing the Housing and Urban 
Development’s grant program).  These grant funds can be used for “construction of public 
facilities and improvements, such as water and sewer facilities, streets, neighborhood 
centers, and the conversion of school buildings for eligible purposes; and provision of 
assistance to profit-motivated businesses to carry out economic development and job 
creation or retention activities.”  Id. at 395. 
38 See, e.g., CAL. STS. & HIGH. CODE § 5898.30 (“[T]he collection of assessments [are] in 
the same manner and at the same time as the general taxes of the city or county on real 
property, and any penalties and remedies in the event of delinquency and default.”); COLO. 
REV. STAT. § 30-20-614 (2002 & Supp. 2010) (explaining that installments “shall be [paid at] 
the same . . . time[] [as] payment for installments of property taxes”); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 5-
18-7.B (West 2010) (“The special assessment shall be . . . collected at the same time and in 
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Oregon’s statute departs from the majority position by not specifying the 
lien’s seniority.39  Maine’s statute makes the greatest departure from the 
majority position because the statute specifically requires the lien to be 
subordinate to preexisting mortgages and liens.40  Many mortgage 
industry groups have strongly criticized the majority’s senior lien 
position. 
2. How PACE Programs Conflict with Fannie/Freddie Lending 
Guidelines 
The most vocal opposition to PACE programs has come from the 
Government Sponsored Enterprises (“GSEs”):  the Federal National 
Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”); the Federal Home Loan Mortgage 
Corporation (“Freddie Mac”); and their conservator, the FHFA.41  On 
                                                                                                             
the same manner as property taxes . . . .”); WIS. STAT. § 66.0627 (2009) (explaining that the 
special assessment may be included as a charge on the resident’s property tax bill); see also 
City of Phoenix v. Wayland, 167 P.2d 933, 934 (Ariz. 1946) (explaining that if two taxes or 
assessments are collected at the same time, they have the same priority). 
39 OR. REV. STAT. § 470.680(2)–(3) (2009). 
(2) . . . . The department shall record a lien on the real property 
benefited by the loan for those indebtedness amounts that are not 
secured by a fixture filing. . . . (3)  An energy efficiency and sustainable 
technology loan must provide for repayment through an on-bill 
financing system unless . . . the department and the borrower specify 
the alternative repayment method in the loan agreement. 
Id. 
40 ME. REV. STAT. tit. 35-A, § 10156.3-3A (2010). 
3. Priority.  Except as provided in paragraph A, the priority of a 
PACE mortgage created under subsection 2 is determined based on the 
date of filing of notice required under subsection 2 and applicable law.  
A PACE mortgage is not entitled to any special or senior priority. 
A. If a property owner’s PACE assessment payments are 
current, upon the refinancing, sale or transfer of the qualifying 
property, other than a judicial sale or foreclosure, the PACE 
mortgage is junior and subordinate in priority to the first 
mortgage used to refinance an existing mortgage or a first 
mortgage of a subsequent purchaser or transferee, regardless of 
the date of the recording of the refinanced first mortgage or the 
first mortgage of the subsequent purchaser or transferee. 
Id. 
41 See Geof Koss, Cities, Businesses Look for Help in Fight Over ‘PACE’ of Retrofits, CQ 
TODAY (Sept. 20, 2010), http://pacenow.org/blog/2010/09/cq-today-cities-businesses-
look-for-help-in-fight-over-%E2%80%98pace%E2%80%99-of-retrofits/ (reporting that 
businesses and cities are urging Congress to settle the “dispute with the [FHFA],” which is 
hindering PACE programs); Timiraos, supra note 33 (reporting that the GSEs are resisting 
PACE programs); Woody, supra note 33 (reporting that the GSEs likely will not accept 
loans that have PACE liens).  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are the two main “secondary 
mortgage market” participants.  MARGARET C. JASPER, HOME MORTGAGE LAW PRIMER 8 (3d 
ed. 2009).  The “secondary [mortgage] market” is a government created market where 
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May 5, 2010, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac issued letters warning lenders 
that PACE programs violate their lending standards because of the 
senior lien provisions.42  In July, the FHFA issued two lender letters 
warning Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to avoid taking on loans 
associated with PACE programs.43  The FHFA also set out specific 
guidelines that required future mortgages in states with PACE programs 
to satisfy loan-to-value (“LTV”) limits, approval requirements, increased 
debt-to-income ratios, and assurances that mortgages comply with state 
and federal laws.44  PACE supporters responded to these criticisms 
through a variety of legal means. 
                                                                                                             
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac purchase “first mortgages from various lenders [which] frees 
the lender’s [sic] finances so that they can make additional loans.”  Id.  Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac each have unique requirements that must be met before they purchase a 
mortgage, but in general their requirements and conditions are very strict.  Id. at 7–8.  For 
another discussion of the secondary mortgage market, see Quintin Johnstone, Land 
Transfers:  Process and Processors, 22 VAL. U. L. REV. 493, 515–16 (1988). 
42 See Industry Letter from Freddie Mac to Freddie Mac Seller/Servicers (May 5, 2010), 
available at http://www.freddiemac.com/sell/guide/bulletins/pdf/iltr050510.pdf 
[hereinafter Freddie Mac Letter] (“[R]emind[ing] Seller/Servicers that an energy-related 
lien may not be senior to any Mortgage delivered to Freddie Mac.”); Lender Letter LL-2010-
06 from Fannie Mae to All Fannie Mae Single-Family Sellers and Servicers (May 5, 2010), 
available at https://www.efanniemae.com/sf/guides/ssg/annltrs/pdf/2010/ll1006.pdf 
[hereinafter Fannie Mae Letter] (advising lenders that “Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Uniform 
Security Instruments prohibit loans that have senior lien status to a mortgage”). 
43 See July 6, 2010 FHFA Press Release, supra note 8 (urging state governments to 
reconsider the programs); Press Release from Federal Housing Finance Agency (July 14, 
2010), available at http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/15963/PACE_ststament_7_14_10.pdf 
(proclaiming that the FHFA “will defend vigorously its actions that aim to protect 
taxpayers, lenders, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac”) [hereinafter July 14, 2010 FHFA Press 
Release].  Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the FHFA are not the only entities concerned about 
PACE programs.  “The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corp[oration]” are concerned that PACE loans’ “priority status . . . raises safety 
and soundness concerns” and that “PACE loans may be made without appropriate 
disclosures.”  29 No. 8 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL’Y REP. 34, 35 (2010).  Finally, “[t]he 
FHFA and OCC also noted the possibility that PACE loans could affect the value of 
mortgage-backed securities that are based on mortgages secured by properties in places 
where the loans are available.  This could affect secondary market participants.”  Id. 
44 July 6, 2010 FHFA Press Release, supra note 8.  This letter grandfathered in existing 
PACE loans with senior lien provisions, but made clear no new senior PACE loans would 
be insured.  Id.  Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Single-Family Uniform Instrument Form 3005 
requires a “[b]orrower [to] promptly discharge any lien which has priority over this 
Security Instrument unless Borrower:  (a) agrees in writing to the payment of the obligation 
secured by the lien in a manner acceptable to Lender.”  See Letter from Chris Lynch to 
PACE Working Group, available at http://pacenow.org/documents/7a.%20JH%20Lien 
%20Issue%20Paper%20CLN.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2011) (reproducing the Uniform 
Instrument Form 3005 language). 
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B. Efforts to Resolve the Issues Through the DOE, the Courts, and Congress 
PACE supporters have attempted to ease the GSEs’ concerns 
through executive, judicial, and legislative actions.  The DOE released 
Best Practices Guidelines, which were designed to ensure that PACE 
loans do not impact preexisting mortgage holders.45  Former California 
Attorney General Edmund Brown filed a complaint in federal court 
seeking declaratory relief against the FHFA, and recently, other parties 
have also filed suit in federal court.46  Finally, members of Congress 
introduced two bills late in the 110th Congressional Term to resolve the 
uncertainty.47 
1. DOE Letter to FHFA and Best Practices Guidelines 
The DOE made the first attempt to ease the GSEs’ concerns when it 
issued Best Practices Guidelines on May 7, 2010.48  The first section of the 
document suggests ways for local governments to structure the 
programs to be more efficient for all stakeholders.49  The second section 
of the document, addressing “Assessment Underwriting,” suggests 
stringent underwriting criteria to “reduce the risk of default.”50 
                                                 
45 See infra Part II.B.1 (explaining the DOE’s Best Practices Guidelines). 
46 See infra Part II.B.2 (describing California’s suit against the FHFA). 
47 See infra Part II.B.3 (explaining Congressional efforts to resolve the PACE 
controversy). 
48 See generally DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 30 (listing the DOE’s guidelines). 
49 See id. at 2–5.  The DOE suggested that local governments only approve cost-effective 
projects with assessment values of only ten percent of the property’s value and an 
assessment term shorter than the estimated useful life of the home improvement being 
installed.  Id. at 2–3. 
50 See id. at 5–7.  Here the DOE recommended only property owners with a higher 
property value than the owner’s combined “public and private debt” be able to qualify for 
PACE programs, as well as safeguards aimed at ensuring property owners be able to pay 
the assessment.  Id. at 6.  Members of the mortgage industry received these voluntary 
guidelines favorably, but expressed concern that the guidelines did not go far enough.  
Letter from John Courson, President & Chief Exec. Officer, Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, to Shaun 
Donovan, Sec’y Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., & Steven Chu, Sec’y Dep’t of Energy (July 9, 
2010) (expressing appreciation for the DOE’s guidelines but noting that there are still 
problems with PACE loans).  For an example of a PACE statute with detailed underwriting 
requirements, see ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 35-A, § 10155.1 (2010): 
A PACE agreement entered into pursuant to a PACE program must 
comply with underwriting requirements established by rule by the 
trust. . . . Underwriting requirements established by the trust must, at a 
minimum: 
A. Limit the amount of a PACE mortgage for qualifying property 
that is residential property to $15,000; 
B. Require debt-to-income ratios of not more than 50% for qualifying 
property that is residential property; 
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Then, on May 24, 2010, the DOE sent a letter to the Director of the 
FHFA asking the FHFA and GSEs to clarify their objections to PACE 
programs.51  The DOE also asked the FHFA to agree in writing to treat 
property owners with preexisting PACE assessments as compliant with 
the GSEs’ Uniform Security Instrument provisions.52  Shortly after the 
DOE issued these guidelines, California’s Attorney General filed suit 
against the FHFA in federal court. 
2. California ex rel Brown v. FHFA 
On July 14, 2010, California Attorney General Edmund Brown filed 
suit against the FHFA in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District 
of California.53  The complaint accused Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and 
                                                                                                             
C. Provide that the term of the PACE agreement not exceed the 
estimated useful life of the financed energy savings 
improvements; 
D. Require that financed energy savings improvements are cost-
effective. . . .  
Id. 
51 Letter from Cathy Zoi, Assistant Sec’y of Dep’t of Energy, to Edward DeMarco, Acting 
Dir. of Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency (May 24, 2010), available at http://www.mpowerplacer.org/ 
forms/L%20DOE%20Letter%20to%20Edward%20DeMarco%20Acting%20FHFA%205-24-
10%20(2).pdf [hereinafter Letter from DOE].  The letter specifically asked the FHFA to 
develop guidelines that PACE programs should implement to be in accordance with the 
GSE’s lending standards.  Id. 
52 Letter from Cathy Zoi, supra note 51.  The FHFA ultimately complied with this 
request.  See supra note 44 (describing the FHFA’s promise to grandfather in PACE loans 
that existed before July 6, 2010). 
53 See generally Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 36 (alleging that the FHFA is prohibiting 
PACE programs).  Former California Attorney General Brown has long been a vocal critic 
of the GSEs’ actions.  In May, he sent a letter to the FHFA reminding Acting Director 
Edward DeMarco of conversations between Brown’s office and the FHFA in 2009.  Letter 
from Edmund Brown, Cal. Attorney Gen., to Edward DeMarco, Acting Dir. of Fed. Hous. 
Fin. Agency (May 18, 2010), available at http://ag.ca.gov/newsalerts/release.php?id= 
1920&.  According to Brown, during the 2009 discussions, the FHFA assured the California 
Attorney General that the FHFA would work with Brown’s office “on issues related to 
PACE.”  Id.  The letter goes on to outline disruptions in PACE programs caused by Fannie 
Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s lender and industry letters.  Id.  The letter concluded by 
requesting immediate written confirmation from the FHFA that California’s programs do 
not violate Fannie Mae’s or Freddie Mac’s lending guidelines.  Id.  If Brown did not receive 
such written confirmation, he threatened to file suit seeking declaratory relief.  Id.  
Apparently, he never received such written confirmation because he filed suit on July 14, 
2010.  Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 36, at 2.  In a press release that day, Brown explained 
that he decided to sue the FHFA “to stop the regulatory strangulation of the state’s grass-
roots program.”  Press Release, Cal. Attorney Gen. Edmund Brown, Brown Demands Feds 
Preserve an Innovative and Successful California Clean Energy Program (May 18, 2010), 
available at http://ag.ca.gov/newsalerts/release.php?id=1920&.  He also sent a letter to 
President Obama, that same day, explaining his reasons for filing suit and urging the 
President “to do everything in [his] power to reverse [the FHFA’s] illegal and short-sighted 
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the FHFA of misrepresenting PACE programs to benefit their own 
financial interests at the expense of California property owners.54  
California alleged that the GSEs inaccurately characterized PACE 
programs as loans, which would seriously harm California’s PACE 
programs.55  The complaint argued that PACE liens have priority over 
mortgages because they are valid property assessments.56  According to 
the complaint, PACE senior lien provisions comply with Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac guidelines because the GSEs have historically accepted 
senior lien provisions in other assessment programs.57 
3. Congressional Efforts to Resolve the Standoff 
Throughout the entire PACE controversy, members of Congress 
have been active spectators, writing letters to the President and 
                                                                                                             
actions” and to provide “leadership on this most important matter.”  Letter from Edmund 
Brown, Cal. Attorney Gen., to President Barack Obama 1–2 (July 14, 2010), available at 
http://ag.ca.gov/cms_attachments/press/pdfs/n1951_ar-m355n_20100714_124838.pdf.  
Five other claims have been filed in federal district court.  Complaint, City of Palm Desert 
v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, No. 4:10CV04482 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2010), 2010 WL 4236788; 
Complaint, Cnty. of Sonoma v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, No. 4:10CV03270 (N.D. Cal. July 
26, 2010); Complaint, Natural Res. Def. Council v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Auth., No. 1:10CV07467 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2010), 2010 WL 4000042; Complaint, Sierra Club v. Fed. Hous. Fin. 
Agency, No. 4:10CV03317 (N.D. Cal. July 29, 2010), 2010 WL 3593758; Town of Babylon v. 
Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, No. 2:10CV04916 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2010). 
54 Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 36, at 2.  California’s complaint specifically alleges that 
the “government-sponsored, shareholder-owned private corporations,” Fannie Mae, 
Freddie Mac, and the FHFA, are “misrepresenting . . . PACE programs and municipal 
financing.”  Id.  As a result, the GSEs are putting their financial interests ahead of the well-
being of California residents, according to the complaint.  Id.  More specifically, the 
complaint accused the GSEs of trying to change the priority of assessments from a senior 
lien to a junior lien “for their own benefit in violation of California law.”  Id. at 8.  As a 
result, the GSEs’ opposition to PACE programs has “severely hamper[ed] California’s 
efforts to assist thousands of California homeowners to reduce their energy and water use, 
help drive the state’s green economy, and create significant numbers of skilled, stable and 
well paying jobs.”  Id. at 2. 
55 Id. at 3.  The complaint noted that the FHFA acknowledged that its public statements 
have “effectively stopp[ed] PACE programs . . . with no clear indication of when, if ever, 
such programs would be allowed to move forward in the future.”  Id. 
56 Id.  The complaint additionally seeks a declaration that the FHFA must “conduct [an] 
environmental review under [the National Environmental Policy Act] before taking any 
action that will limit or foreclose PACE in California.”  Id. 
57 See id. at 5–6 (asserting that “[u]nder the plain language of California law, any liens 
that result from PACE assessments have priority over mortgages, operating in the same 
way as other assessments”).  Municipal corporations are authorized to set up PACE 
programs pursuant to the Mello-Roos Act, CAL. GOV. CODE § 5331, “which has been in 
existence since 1982.”  Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 36, at 5–6.  But see Eisen, supra note 28, 
at 86 (describing PACE programs as “more like . . . lending program[s] and less like . . . a 
tax”). 
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introducing bills, but taking no definitive action.58  In October 2009, 
Congressman Steve Israel introduced a bill in the House of 
Representatives to help homeowners obtain private financing for energy 
retrofits.59  Congress became more active as the standoff between PACE 
supporters and the GSEs came to a head in the summer of 2010. 
Congressman Mike Thompson and Senator Barbara Boxer, both from 
California, introduced identical bills in the House and Senate to amend 
Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s underwriting standards to comply with 
the DOE’s PACE guidelines.60  Under the proposed legislation, any lien 
provisions that complied with the DOE’s standards would automatically 
comply with Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s Uniform Instruments.61  
The bills prohibit the GSEs from requiring homeowners to repay PACE 
liens before being able to refinance or dispose of their property.62  Under 
                                                 
58 See Letter from Congress to President Barack Obama (July 19, 2010), available at 
http://www.seia.org/galleries/pdf/PACE%20Letter%20to%20President%20Obama%207.
19.10.pdf (expressing strong Congressional support for PACE programs).  See generally H.R. 
5766, 111th Cong. (2d Sess. 2010) (proposing “[t]o ensure that the underwriting standards 
of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac facilitate the use of property assessed clean energy 
programs”); S. 3642, 111th Cong. (2d Sess. 2010) (proposing a plan identical to the plan set 
forth in H.R. 5766); H.R. 3836, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009) (proposing “[t]o authorize the 
Secretary of Energy to provide credit support to enhance the availability of private 
financing for clean energy technology deployment”). 
59 See H.R. 3836 (enabling the Secretary of Energy to provide credit to homeowners for 
these projects).  The bill was referred to the House Energy and Commerce Committee on 
October 15, 2009, and the Committee has taken no further action.  Bill Summary & Status 
111th Congress (2009–2010) H.R. 3836, LIBRARY CONG.:  THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/ 
cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:h.r.03836:# (last visited Oct. 15, 2011). 
60 H.R. 5766; S. 3642.  In a press release from Senator Barbara Boxer’s office, Boxer 
described the current uncertainty as “unacceptable,” while Senator Jeff Merkey of Oregon 
described PACE programs as “a job creation trifecta” because these programs save 
homeowners and businesses money, create jobs, and support the development of clean 
energy.  Press Release, Senator Barbara Boxer, Boxer, Colleagues Introduce Legislation to 
Protect Clean-Energy Initiatives (July 22, 2010), available at http://boxer.senate.gov/en/ 
press/releases/072210.cfm.  According to the release, the bill requires Fannie and Freddie 
to “adopt new, sound underwriting standards that support PACE financing programs, 
rather than stymie them [and] treat PACE assessments the same as other property tax 
assessments . . . .”  Id.  The Senate version has four co-sponsors, while the identical House 
version has twenty co-sponsors.  Id. 
61 H.R. 5766; S. 3642.  The bills explain that: 
Liens or other property obligations that secure property taxes or 
assessments under a PACE program and are consistent with such 
standards shall be considered to comply with the Uniform Instruments 
of such Association and Corporation and shall not constitute a default 
on an existing mortgage or trigger the exercise of lender’s remedies for 
a property with such a lien. 
Id. 
62 See H.R. 5766; S. 3642 (stipulating that “the Association and the Corporation shall not 
require repayment of a PACE program tax or assessment in order for a property owner to 
finance, refinance or transfer the property”). 
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these bills, if a property owner becomes delinquent in his or her PACE 
payments, the property owner only owes “the unpaid delinquent 
amount along with applicable penalties, interest and costs” in a 
foreclosure.63  Finally, the bill prohibits the GSEs from implementing 
different lending criteria for communities with PACE programs and 
communities without PACE programs.64  
Though these two bills represented Congress’s strongest attempt to 
resolve the PACE controversy, they did not become law before the 
Congressional term ended; each had only a small number of co-sponsors, 
and neither made it out of committee.65  The inadequacy of these 
solutions becomes apparent when examining the policy behind 
municipal financing and tax liens. 
C. The Relationship Between Bonds and Tax Liens 
While local governments typically issue bonds to finance 
improvements in special assessment districts, they can only use bonds to 
finance public projects, and the bonds must finance capital 
improvements.66  Even if the bond results in a private gift, the bond can 
still be for a public purpose; thus, it can still be a valid exercise of a 
                                                 
63 H.R. 5766; S. 3642.  This is also a provision in the DOE’s Best Practices framework.  
DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 30, at 3 (suggesting that local governments utilize non-
acceleration clauses so that the defaulting owner only has to pay the delinquent amount, 
not the total amount, of a PACE lien in a foreclosure).  According to the DOE, non-
acceleration clauses are an important tool to protect mortgage holders because of the 
limited liability in a mortgage.  Id.  Under these provisions, subsequent property owners 
must make future PACE lien payments.  Id. 
64 See H.R. 5766; S. 3642 (prohibiting the FHFA, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac from 
“discriminat[ing] against communities implementing or participating in a PACE program, 
including by prohibiting lending within the community or requiring more restrictive 
underwriting criteria for properties within the community”). 
65 See Bill Summary & Status 111th Congress (2009–2010) H.R. 5766, LIBRARY CONG.:  
THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:HR05766:|/home/Legislative 
Data.php|# (last visited Oct. 15, 2011) (listing fifty-six cosponsors, and reporting that the 
last major action occurred on July 15, 2010 when the bill was referred to the House 
Financial Services Committee); Bill Summary & Status 111th Congress (2009–2010) S.3642, 
LIBRARY CONG.:  THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:SN03642:|/ 
home/LegislativeData.php| (last visited Oct. 15, 2011) (listing five cosponsors, and 
reporting that the last major action occurred on July 22, 2010 when the bill was referred to 
the Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee). 
66 See WHITE, supra note 6, at 8 (explaining that bonds can only finance public projects, 
not private gifts).  Further, “prohibitions against gifts and loans of credit to individuals and 
private corporations are the most frequently noted state constitutional limitations affecting 
municipal bond issuance.”  Id.; see also CAL. STS. & HIGH. CODE § 5101 (West 2007) 
(authorizing bond financing for “any . . . streets, places, public ways, or property, 
easements, or rights-of-way”); N.Y. LOCAL FIN. § 24.00 (McKinney 2009) (authorizing bond 
financing, termed “tax anticipation notes” for water lighting or refuse and garbage district). 
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municipality’s financing powers.67  Both prohibitions have the same 
general intent:  to prevent taxpayers from having to pay for a bond long 
after the benefit has gone away.68 
Aside from these general limitations on bond issues, each particular 
type of municipal bond is subject to a unique set of limitations.69  While 
municipalities may issue revenue bonds, general bonds, and special 
assessment bonds, only special assessment bonds and mortgage-backed 
revenue bonds are relevant to the discussion of PACE programs.70  Local 
governments can issue assessment bonds with senior lien repayment 
provisions under their assessment authority.71  The distinction between 
junior and senior liens is essential to understanding the controversy 
surrounding PACE programs. 
The difference between a senior and junior interest is crucial in 
determining what a mortgagee or lien holder will receive in a foreclosure 
                                                 
67 WHITE, supra note 6, at 8.  For example, a municipality can “use . . . bond proceeds to 
enable a private corporation to install pollution control equipment in its manufacturing 
enterprise . . . because the public purpose is satisfied.”  Id.  The public purpose requirement 
originates from municipalities’ early experiences with railroad bonds.  Id.  When a railroad 
failed, the taxpayers still had to pay the debt from the railroad bond, even though the 
purpose for which the bond had been raised no longer existed.  Id. 
68 See id. (explaining that the prohibition of private gifts and requirement of capital 
improvements lessen the chances that taxpayers will have “to pay for something 
nonexistent”).  Without these requirements, “the burden of bond payment may outweigh 
the benefit of enjoyment of the service or facility.”  Id.; see also Haberman v. Washington 
Pub. Power Supply Sys., 744 P.2d 1032, 1045–46 (Wash. 1987) (noting that residents in a 
Washington town had to pursue damages against a municipality through various tort and 
securities law claims after the power utility cancelled a nuclear power plant construction 
project).  The project in Haberman never should have been financed through municipal 
bonds because the power utility engaged in deceptive and fraudulent representations.  Id.  
Similarly, in Ross v. Bank South, N.A., developers convinced Vestiva Hills, Alabama to back 
a bond issuance aimed at raising funds to construct “a residential and medical facility for 
the elderly.”  885 F.2d 723, 726 (11th Cir. 1989).  Investors were forced to sue the issuing 
authority on various federal and state securities law grounds as well as tort law grounds 
when they lost money because the value of the project was far below the original 
$29,950,500 value of the bonds.  Id. at 725.  Finally, in Ockerman v. May Zima & Co., May 
Zima & Company “publicly sold Mortgage Revenue Bonds issued by the City of Bowling 
Green, Kentucky, for $5,500,000.00 . . . to acquire . . . a retirement village in Bowling Green, 
Kentucky.”  27 F.3d 1151, 1153 (6th Cir. 1994).  They were forced to sue the issuers under 
federal securities laws.  Id. at 1154.  In each of these situations, the burden of paying the 
bonds outweighed the benefit to the public. 
69 See WHITE, supra note 6, at 10 (describing the types of projects that each type of 
municipal bond may finance and the requirements that must be met before each type of 
bond can be used). 
70 See id. at 10–11 (noting that “mortgage-backed bonds[] are of particular interest to 
solar facility financing”). 
71 See id. (explaining local governments’ bond authority). 
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sale.72  When a financial institution forecloses one interest, only interests 
junior to it are foreclosed.73  In a foreclosure, the property is sold and the 
sale price is used to satisfy the senior mortgage.74  If there is money left, 
that surplus satisfies junior liens in order of their priority.75  These junior 
                                                 
72 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:  MORTG. § 7.4 (1997) (describing the difference 
between junior and senior liens).  All junior mortgages and liens are referred to as 
“secondary financing.”  JASPER, supra note 41, at 7 (internal quotation marks omitted).  A 
party holding junior debt will not be fully protected in the event of a foreclosure.  See 
Symposium on Commercial Law, Foreclosure, Loss, and the Proper Distribution of Insurance 
Proceeds Under the Open and Standard Mortgage Clauses:  Some Observations, 7 VAL. U. L. REV. 
485, 486 (1973) (“The mortgagee’s interest under the policy extends only to a security for 
his debt, and such interest ceases when the debt is extinguished.”).  “A foreclosure of the 
mortgaged property . . . therefore, totally extinguish[es] the interest.”  Id.   
73 See Sumitomo Bank v. Davis, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 381, 385 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (explaining 
that a foreclosure sale “removes liens . . . junior to the one being foreclosed”); see also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:  MORTG. § 7.1 (1997) (noting that “a valid foreclosure” of a 
senior mortgage eliminates all junior mortgages and liens but not senior mortgages or 
liens); MILTON R. FRIEDMAN, FRIEDMAN ON CONTRACTS AND CONVEYANCES OF REAL 
PROPERTY § 3.163 (James Charles Smith ed., 2010) (explaining that junior interests often 
contain a clause stipulating that “any default in the first mortgage shall, ipso facto, 
constitute a default in the junior mortgage and permit its foreclosure”).  Comment a 
explains that in general mortgage and lien seniority is “determined by the chronological 
order of their creation.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:  MORTG. § 7.1 cmt. a (1997). 
74 See General Bank v. Westbrooke Pointe, Inc., 548 So. 2d 736, 736 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1989) (noting the well established Florida principle that any surplus from a foreclosure 
should be distributed to “junior lienholders” based on the junior lien’s priority); see also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:  MORTG. § 7.4 (1997) (“When the foreclosure sale price 
exceeds the amount of the mortgage obligation, the surplus is applied to liens and other 
interests terminated by the foreclosure in order of their priority and the remaining balance, 
if any, is distributed to the holder of the equity of redemption.”); JASPER, supra note 41, at 7 
(explaining that junior mortgages and liens have high risk because the lender only has a 
property interest in the surplus after all prior mortgages have been satisfied).  If the 
property owner does not have enough equity in the property to cover all senior mortgages 
and junior liens, the junior lien holders will not receive any compensation in a foreclosure.  
Id.  “[E]quity” is defined as “the difference between the current market value of the 
property and the total debt obligations against the property, including any prior mortgage 
loans.”  Id.  In determining a property’s equity, lenders look at the property’s LTV, which is 
calculated by “divid[ing] the total loan amount by the value of [the] home.”  Id. at 43–44.  
Each additional mortgage or lien increases the property’s LTV, which increases the 
likelihood that the mortgages will not be repaid.  Id. at 44. 
75 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:  MORTG. § 7.4 cmt. a (1997); see also JASPER, supra note 
41, at 85–86 (noting that a “foreclosure . . . put[s] the foreclosure sale purchaser in the shoes 
of the borrower at the time he executed the mortgage being foreclosed”); GRANT S. NELSON 
& DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW 696 (5th ed. 2007) (“[T]he surplus 
represents the remnant of the equity of redemption . . . [and] [c]onsequently . . . stands in 
the place of the foreclosed real estate and the liens and interest that previously attached to 
that real estate now attach to the surplus.”).  People who held interests in the land are 
“paid out of the surplus in the order of priority they enjoyed prior to foreclosure.”  Id. at 
697. 
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liens are paid in the same order of priority as before the foreclosure.76  A 
property owner can change the order of priority by subordinating a 
mortgage to another lien, but in general, the person whose interest is 
being subordinated must consent to the change.77  Subordination is 
usually disadvantageous to the holders of senior interests.78 
The difference between junior and senior liens also affects the bond’s 
rating.79  Bonds with subordinate or junior repayment provisions are 
termed “junk bonds” because they are less likely to be repaid.80  
                                                 
76 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:  MORTG. § 7.4 cmt. b (1997).  Also, “foreclosed junior 
lienors are entitled to surplus even though their liens are not in default at the time of 
foreclosure.”  Id.  Finally, the claim of the holder of the foreclosed equity of redemption to 
the surplus is subordinate to the claims of all other holders of liens and interests terminated 
by the foreclosure.  Id.; see also Brown v. Crookston Agric. Ass’n, 26 N.W. 907, 907 (Minn. 
1886) (explaining that once a property is foreclosed, “the junior mortgagee is 
transferred . . . to the surplus of the money arising from the sale . . . [and] the court will 
apply the [surplus] in accordance with their rights as they existed with respect to the 
land”). 
77 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:  MORTG. § 7.7 (1997). 
A mortgage, by a declaration of its mortgagee, may be made 
subordinate in priority to another interest in the mortgaged real 
estate . . . if the interest to which the mortgage is being subordinated is 
described with reasonable specificity in the declaration.  A 
subordination that would materially prejudice the mortgagor or the 
person whose interest is advanced in priority is ineffective without the 
consent of the person prejudiced. 
Id.; see also THOMAS D. CRANDALL ET AL., THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS § 8.09(2)(b) 
(1991) (describing the two methods of subordination). 
78 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:  MORTG. § 7.7 cmt. a (1997) (explaining that 
subordination “reduce[s] the mortgage’s priority below that of some other interest . . . to 
which the mortgage would otherwise be superior”); see also CRANDALL, supra note 77, 
§ 8.09(2)(a) (noting that lenders will hesitate to lend if the property is already subject to a 
senior interest because of “the legitimate concern of the potential lender that his later-in-
time mortgage may be subordinate to an existing interest”). 
79 See Georgette C. Poindexter et al., Selling Municipal Property Tax Receivables:  Economics, 
Privatization, and Public Policy in an Era of Urban Distress, 30 CONN. L. REV. 157, 171 (1997) 
(explaining that a lien’s priority is its “determinative and crucial factor” in assessing the 
value of the lien because “[a]n inferior lien . . . is of less value to the purchaser” since these 
liens are satisfied only after all superior liens have been satisfied).  See generally Johnstone, 
supra note 41, at 516 (explaining that lenders will take secondary market purchasers’ 
preferences into account when making a loan, which means that “resale marketability is 
usually a consideration during the mortgage loan origination stage”). 
80 See WILLIAM W. BRATTON, CORPORATE FINANCE:  CASES AND MATERIALS 244 (6th ed. 
2008) (explaining that Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s rate an issuing entity’s “likelihood 
of default”).  Under Standard & Poor’s rating system, “rates [range] between AAA and D 
(default), [where] [j]unk is below BBB.”  Id.; see also Fitch Affirms Cape Coral, FL's 
Outstanding Water & Sewer Revs, BANs & Special Assessment Debt, BUSINESSWIRE (May 27, 
2010, 5:47 PM), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20100527006879/en/Fitch-
Affirms-Cape-Coral-FLs-Outstanding-Water (reporting on two Cape Coral Florida bond 
issues, one which was rated A+, and the other was rated BBB+).  The A+ rated bond had a 
senior lien payback provision but the BBB+ rated bond had a subordinate repayment 
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Investors often hesitate to invest in these junk bonds because they are not 
guaranteed a return on their investment.81  Conversely, investors 
willingly invest in bonds with senior repayment provisions, typically 
referred to as AAA or AA bonds, because they are fairly certain to 
receive a return on their investment.82  Since AAA or AA bonds are 
much more likely to attract investors than junk bonds, programs with 
senior lien provisions are more likely to successfully finance the 
proposed improvement.83  This means that a bond’s value is directly 
related to a lien’s priority. 
While mortgage or lien priority is generally determined by the “first 
in time, first in right” principal, there are several important exceptions.84  
                                                                                                             
provision.  Id.  But see Fitch Rates Bay Area Toll Bridge, CA Seismic Bonds ‘AA’, FREE LIBRARY 
(July 24, 2003), http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Fitch+Rates+Bay +Area+Toll+Bridge,+CA 
+Seismic+Bonds+'AA'.-a0105782041 (reporting on a plan in California to make two bond 
issues, one with a senior lien priority and one with a junior lien priority to finance bridge 
upgrades).  The California plan’s second lien priority is significant because it shows that 
junior liens are a feasible means of raising revenue.  Id. 
81 See STANDARD & POOR’S, THE TIME DIMENSION OF STANDARD & POOR’S CREDIT 
RATINGS 11 (2010), available at http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/media/ 
TheTimeDimensionOfStandardPoorsCreditRatings.pdf (explaining that “rating definitions 
are phrased in terms of an obligor’s capacity to meet its financial commitment”) (internal 
quotations omitted); see also STONE & YOUNGBERG, LAND-SECURED MUNICIPAL DEBT:  A 
GUIDE TO BUYING NON-RATED, LAND-SECURED BONDS 3 (2007) (urging investors to invest 
in land-secured bonds if “[t]he value of the land being taxed [or] assessed is at least three 
times the bond lien” to “offset credit weaknesses” inherent in land-secured municipal 
financing). 
82 STANDARD & POOR’S, supra note 81, at 11 (“The actual language of the definitions uses 
different adjectives . . . to describe the obligor’s capacity as follows:  ‘AAA’ (extremely 
strong), ‘AA’ (very strong), ‘A’ (strong), and ‘BBB’ (adequate).”).  The S&P guidelines break 
down the obligor’s ability to pay into four categories.  See id. 
83 See Urbish v. City of Dallas, 260 S.W.2d 148, 150 (Tex. App. 1953) (explaining that if 
municipal bonds are offered with junior lien repayment provisions, the government’s 
purpose behind issuing the bonds would not be funded); see also Letter from Chris 
Moriarty, Dir., & John Rhow, Senior Vice President, Barclays Capital, to Jeffrey 
Tannenbaum, Fir Tree Partners (Sept. 14, 2009), available at http://pacenow.org/ 
documents/Pace%20letter%20sept%202009%20re%20liens%20_2_%20_2_%20-
%20Barclays%20%209-14-09%20_3_.pdf [hereinafter Barclay’s Letter] (arguing that 
Standard and Poor’s rating system applies to PACE bonds and that junior PACE liens 
would generate “little to no meaningful bond buyer interest”). 
84 The “‘first in time, first in right’” principle means that “[t]he first lien recorded 
generally gets priority over later-recorded liens.”  SCHMUDDE, supra note 8, at 307; see 
CRANDALL ET AL., supra note 77, § 8.09(b) (noting that “‘first in time, first in right’ is the 
basic priority rule regarding interests in real estate, including mortgages”); JASPER, supra 
note 41, at 86 (explaining that the “first in time, first in right” priority is “established by 
compliance with the recording acts”); see also Vesta Holdings I, LLC v. Tax Comm’r of 
Fulton Cnty., 578 S.E.2d 293, 295 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (explaining that the “first in time, first 
in right” principle applies to “mortgages . . . and nontax liens”); Pelican Homestead & Sav. 
Ass’n v. Sec. First Nat’l. Bank, 532 So. 2d 397, 400 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that “[t]he 
priority of competing mortgages” is determined by when the mortgages were filed and not 
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PACE supporters argue that PACE programs fall within one exception, 
the tax lien.85  State legislatures have the power to create tax liens and  
determine their priority relative to that of other types of liens and 
property interests, even if the tax lien was created after other property 
interests came into existence.86  While a state may give a tax lien any 
                                                                                                             
by the parties’ intent); Valley Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n. v. T-Bird Home Centers, Inc., 741 
P.2d 826, 828 (N.M. 1987) (holding that T-Bird’s lien is senior because T-Bird’s workers 
began work before Valley Federal’s mortgage was recorded).  This rule “applies to 
resolving . . . priority disputes between mortgages, [and] to disputes between a mortgagee 
and another form of interest.”  CRANDALL ET AL., supra note 77, § 8.09(b).  But see 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:  MORTG. § 7.1 cmt. a (1997) (noting that the “first in time, 
first in right” rule “is subject to a multitude of limitations”).  Priority rules developed in the 
English colonies and in the early years of the American Republic.  See George Lee Flint, Jr. 
& Marie Juliet Alfaro, Secured Transactions History:  The Impact of English Smuggling on 
Chattel Mortgage Acts in the Spanish Borderlands, 37 VAL. U. L. REV. 703, 755–56 (2003) 
(examining early recording statutes that “were mandatory for realty mortgages” that 
mandated “priority by time of filing”).  Indeed, the “first in time, first in right” principle 
was so well-settled in American property law, that Chief Justice John Marshall “believed 
[it] to be universal” only a half-century after the founding of the Republic.  Rankin & 
Schatzell v. Scott, 25 U.S. 177, 179 (1827).   “[A] prior lien gives a prior claim” and “[i]t has 
never been supposed that a subsequent mortgage could . . . obtain precedence over a prior 
mortgage.”  Id. 
85 See DeVries & Lynch, supra note 5, at 6 (arguing that these “programs are a legal 
exercise of the municipal taxing power”).  According to PACE proponents, the liens 
imposed by these programs are valid tax assessment liens.  Id. 
86 See EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 44.142 (3d ed. 2011) 
(noting that “[T]he legislature has the full power to determine and fix the priority of tax 
liens [and] has unquestioned power to make these liens prior and superior to other liens 
and encumbrances”); see also In re Boerne Hills Leasing Corp., 15 F.3d 57, 59 (5th Cir. 1994) 
(holding that state taxing entities’ liens are senior to other creditors’ liens); City of Phoenix 
v. Wayland, 167 P.2d 933, 934 (Ariz. 1946) (explaining that the state “[l]egislature has full 
power” to make tax liens senior to all other liens “[u]nless restricted by the state 
Constitution”); ITT Diversified Credit Corp. v. Couch, 669 P.2d 1355, 1362 (Colo. 1983) 
(noting that the state legislature has the power to “establish the relative priority of tax 
liens”); Vesta Holdings I, LLC, 578 S.E.2d at 294–95 (holding that the legislature has the 
power to rank tax liens ahead of other types of mortgages and liens); Baldwin v. Moroney, 
91 N.E. 3, 5 (Ind. 1910) (explaining that the state legislature can impose assessment liens 
superior to “pre-existing mortgages”); Licking v. Hays Lumber Co., 19 N.W.2d 148, 150 
(Neb. 1945) (explaining that tax lien priority is determined by “local constitutions and 
statutes” and legislatures can make such liens senior to any preexisting liens or mortgages); 
First NH Bank v. Town of Windham, 639 A.2d 1089, 1091 (N.H. 1994) (noting that tax liens 
may become “superior encumbrances” either by express or implied statutory provisions); 
State ex rel. Comm’r Land Office v. Passmore, 115 P.2d 120, 121 (Okla. 1941) (describing tax 
liens as “creatures of the [state] Constitution or statutes”); Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. 
Black, 247 P. 486, 487 (Utah 1926) (explaining that the state legislature can make a tax lien 
superior to “all other liens of whatsoever nature”); Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Bench Canal 
Drainage Dist., 108 P.2d 590, 593 (Wy. 1940) (explaining that the state legislature has the 
power to fix the priority of assessment liens); 72 AM. JUR. 2D State and Local Taxation § 806 
(2001) (“Statutes may make tax liens a first lien upon the property of the taxpayer, giving 
them priority over a mortgage or any other lien existing against the property, whether 
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priority, state statutes usually give municipal tax liens a senior lien 
position because this is the only way that local governments can collect 
the money from the property owner.87 
                                                                                                             
created before or after the assessment of the tax.”); 72 AM. JUR. 2D State and Local Taxation 
§ 798 (2001) (pointing out that the priority of tax liens is determined by “local constitutions 
and statutes”).  But see Wayland, 167 P.2d at 934 (explaining that tax or assessment liens 
from different state entities (i.e. state taxes and county taxes) only have the equal priority if 
“they are all collected together at one time,” otherwise the tax collected later is junior to the 
tax collected earlier). 
87 See Scottish Am. Mortgage Co., Ltd. v. Minidoka Cnty., 272 P. 498, 500 (Idaho 1928) 
(explaining that if tax liens were not senior to all other liens, “the state would be powerless 
to collect her revenue” since other liens often exceed the property’s value); Minneapolis 
Threshing Machine Co. v. Roberts Cnty., 149 N.W. 163, 164 (S.D. 1914) (“It is essential, in 
order that the state may collect its revenue and carry on the public business, to make such a 
tax a paramount lien . . . .”); Urbish, 260 S.W.2d at 150 (explaining that tax or assessment 
liens exist to ensure that a governmental project is properly financed); 72 AM. JUR. 2D State 
and Local Taxation § 806  (2001) (maintaining that a senior tax lien is constitutional, and 
“essential, in order that the state may collect its revenue and carry on the public 
business . . .”); see also Freeman Furniture Factories v. Bowlds, 136 F.2d 136, 140 (6th Cir. 
1943) (explaining that only “state and county taxes . . . and prior improvement taxes” are 
senior to local assessments) (internal quotation marks omitted); Cal. Loan & Trust Co. v. 
Weis, 50 P. 697, 698 (Cal. 1897) (validating the legislature’s power to impose senior 
assessment liens); Horn v. City of Miami Beach, 194 So. 620, 624 (Fla. 1940) (holding that 
lawful tax liens create a lien senior “to all other liens”); Riviera Club v. Belle Mead Dev. 
Corp., 194 So. 783, 785 (Fla. 1939) (holding that mortgage rights must be junior to “proper 
and lawful taxes”); City of Lake Worth v. McLeod, 151 So. 318, 319 (Fla. 1933) (explaining 
that “municipal special assessments” and state statutory tax liens only have the same 
priority if the state statute explicitly provides so); Wabash E. Ry. Co. v. Comm’rs of E. Lake 
Fork Special Drainage Dist., 25 N.E. 781, 785 (Ill. 1890) (explaining that a purchaser and 
lender enter into a mortgage with notice that local governments have an implied right to 
create liens senior to their mortgage); Joe Self Chevrolet, Inc. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 802 
P.2d 1231, 1240 (Kan. 1990) (noting that state legislatures may make tax liens senior to other 
liens or mortgages since the priority is “determined by the constitution and statute”); 
Rosenthal v. Floor Coverings, Inc., 73 So. 2d 39, 41 (La. Ct. App. 1954) (noting that the tax 
collector can demand payment of delinquent taxes before payment of other debts); 
Collector of Taxes of Lowell v. Slafsky, 127 N.E.2d 309, 312 (Mass. 1955) (explaining that tax 
payments are supposed to be paid before payments to creditors); Krull v. Bennett Homes & 
Lumber Co., 258 A.D. 10, 13 (N.Y. App. Div. 1939) (explaining that courts must look at state 
statutes when determining whether municipal tax liens have the same priority as state tax 
liens); Dunkirk Trust Co. v. Dunkirk Laundry Co., 182 N.Y.S.2d 381, 383 (Chautauqua 
County Ct. 1959) (explaining that New York statutes stipulate that “local taxes, assessments 
and water rates” are senior to other liens); Pope v. Knoxville Indus. Bank, Inc., 121 S.W.2d 
530, 532 (Tenn. 1938) (reversing a lower court ruling which “den[ied] priority in payment 
of the tax debt”); Herbert C. Heller & Co. v. P. O. Duncan, 159 S.E. 52, 53 (W. Va. 1931) 
(holding that both paving liens and sewer liens are senior to other liens); Poindexter, supra 
note 79, at 157 (explaining that tax liens “usually have super priority over all other liens 
except those imposed by the federal or state government”).  Additionally, real estate taxes 
are extremely efficient, in large part because the first priority position of property taxes 
“virtually ensur[es] that it can be paid from the proceeds of the sale of the property.”  
SCHMUDDE, supra note 8, at 263. 
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In recent years, many local governments have privatized their 
collection of real estate taxes, which serves to make the collection even 
more efficient and to ensure that local governments “efficiently collect 
their real estate taxes.”88  The ultimate resolution of these financial and 
legal disputes depends on whether PACE programs can be classified as 
property tax assessments with senior lien status.89 
D. The Specific Elements of a Valid Special Assessment District 
A valid property assessment must meet several elements:  For 
instance, it must serve a public purpose and must provide a local 
improvement. 90  The improvement must also benefit the public at large, 
                                                 
88 SCHMUDDE, supra note 8, at 264.  This process is known as “tax farming” and is now 
used in most U.S. jurisdictions.  Id.  This process allows municipal corporations to hold a 
first priority lien on property with delinquent taxes, and sell the lien to an investor.  Id.  The 
investor must pay cash for the lien and then either collects delinquent money from the 
property owner or forecloses on the property.  Id.  In exchange, the municipal corporation 
is able to shift the collection and foreclosure burden to a third party and receive full 
payment for the debts owed.  Id. 
89 See infra Part III (analyzing whether PACE programs satisfy the requirements of valid 
property assessments). 
90 See Ruel v. Rapid City, 167 N.W.2d 541, 544 (S.D. 1969) (explaining that local 
governments use special assessments to raise funds for a specific “municipal purpose,” and 
as a result, only apply the assessment to a specific portion of the municipality).  Special 
assessments have the same practical effect as taxes, but are not, in a legal sense, taxes.  
FRIEDMAN, supra note 73, § 4.73; see also In re Peplinski’s Estate, 39 A.2d 271, 274 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1944) (explaining that assessments “are not taxes in a strict sense of the word”); 70C 
AM. JUR. 2D Special or Local Assessments § 2 (2010) (explaining that while the terms “tax” and 
“assessment” are often used interchangeably, they are not the same).  An assessment is a 
“distribution of a burden that would otherwise be imposed on the public.”  70C AM. JUR. 
2D Special or Local Assessments § 2 (2010).  Additionally, an assessment is a “specific levy 
designed to recover the costs of improvements that confer local and peculiar benefits upon 
property within a defined area.”  Id.  The bond must finance “an improvement that confers 
a general benefit upon the public at large within the assessing entity [and] 
must . . . support . . . an improvement that confers a special benefit upon the individual 
properties assessed.”  WHITE, supra note 6, at 15; see also Lipscomb v. Lenon, 276 S.W. 367, 
368 (Ark. 1925) (explaining that the improvement must “peculiarly and especially 
benefit[]” property in the district); Bank v. Bell, 217 P. 538, 543 (Cal. 1932) (explaining that 
legislatures have discretion in defining a public purpose); Daggett v. Colgan, 28 P. 51, 52 
(Cal. 1891) (explaining that the legislature must decide “what is for the public good, and 
what are public purposes”); City of Waukegan v. DeWolf, 101 N.E. 532, 533 (Ill. 1913) 
(explaining that an assessment must primarily provide a public improvement for the 
specific residents of the district, though it may provide an incidental benefit for the general 
public as well).  In Saunders v. Mayor of Arlington, the Georgia Supreme Court reasoned that 
if the city’s maintenance of an ice plant was “for the public good” it could be upheld.  94 
S.E. 1022, 1024 (Ga. 1918).  The Georgia Supreme Court upheld the public financing of an 
ice plant because the installation of such a plant clearly benefits the “health and comfort of 
the citizens.”  Id.  Another example of a local improvement is the installation of utility 
poles.  Ewart v. Vill. of W. Springs, 54 N.E. 478, 480 (Ill. 1899).  A tax, on the other hand, “is 
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and not just the property owner, to meet the public purpose test.91  
Additionally, assessments can only be applied to lands that receive 
special benefits.92  The benefits must be based on something more than 
                                                                                                             
an enforced contribution to provide for the support of government.  United States v. La 
Franca, 282 U.S. 568, 572 (1931); see also U.S. v. Reorganized CF&I Fabricators of Utah, 518 
U.S. 213, 224 (1996) (applying the definition in La Franca to a case dealing with the federal 
Bankruptcy Code).  The debate over the definition of a tax is playing out in the federal 
courts as part of the legal challenge to the Affordable Care Act.  See Thomas More Law 
Center v. Obama, No. 10-2388, 2011 WL 2556039, at *20 (6th Cir. June, 2011) (applying the 
La Franca definition to hold that the disputed provision is not a tax). 
91 Halsted v. Sacramento, 52 Cal. Rptr. 637, 642 (Cal. Ct. App. 1966); see also City of 
Whittier v. Dixon, 151 P.2d 5, 7 (Cal. 1944) (holding that an assessment to finance 
construction of parking lots is a public improvement because parking lots benefit 
neighboring properties by leading to economic development in the assessed community); 
Irish v. Hahn, 281 P. 385, 387 (Cal. 1929) (holding that a municipality’s installation of 
underground conduits for electric wires was a public improvement, and citing precedent 
cases which held construction of a tunnel and construction of lights for a trolley as public 
improvements); City of Edwardsville v. Jenkins, 33 N.E. 2d 598, 601 (Ill. 1941) (holding that 
improvement of a sewer system was a public improvement); Hamilton v. Portland Pier Site 
Dist., 112 A. 836, 840 (Me. 1921) (explaining that a municipality could finance the 
construction of a public dock, but could not finance the construction of a private dock); 
Hinman v. Temple, 274 N.W. 605, 607 (Neb. 1937) (holding that construction of a viaduct 
over a busy railroad right of way is a public benefit).  In Hamilton, the Maine Supreme 
Court held that South Portland, Maine could finance the construction of a public dock 
because the dock would benefit the local community by allowing businesses to transport 
goods from the highway to a shipping line by water.  Hamilton, 112 A. at 840.  The court 
distinguished such docks from purely private docks where “[t]he owner . . . may have the 
right to the exclusive enjoyment of the structure, and to exclude all other persons from its 
use.”  Id. (internal quotations omitted).  Although the Maine statute in question allowed 
South Portland to finance public and private docks, the court only invalidated that 
provision, while allowing the municipality to continue financing pubic docks.  Id. 
92 See Halsted, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 642 (reasoning that property assessments are based on the 
theory that the property owner receives a benefit from the improved property); Dixon, 151 
P.2d at 7 (holding that assessed property must receive a special benefit).  Further, an 
assessment can only be applied to a piece of property if the property is actually benefited.  
Halsted, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 642.  The court noted, however, that the assessment will possibly 
satisfy the benefit requirement if “the property can be presumed to have received an 
especial benefit” from the work completed.  Id. (emphasis omitted); see also Martin v. Dist. 
of Colombia, 205 U.S. 135, 140 (1907) (explaining that “the apportionment is to be limited to 
the benefit”); Baldwin v. Moroney, 91 N.E. 3, 5 (Ind. 1910) (reasoning that property owners 
take property with the understanding that the local government may impose a burden on 
the property to pay for improvements that provide a special benefit to the property); Fisher 
v. City of Astoria, 269 P. 853, 856 (Or. 1928) (explaining that an improvement must 
“substantial[ly] benefit” a property before a local government can impose an assessment); 
In re Peplinski’s Estate, 39 A.2d at 274 (Assessments “are based on a theory of special benefit 
to the property against which the assessments are levied”); Ruel, 167 N.W.2d at 545 (local 
governments make special assessments if the assessed property receives a special benefit); 
MCQUILLIN, supra note 86, § 38.37 (explaining that in general only property receiving a 
benefit may be assessed).  The Oregon Supreme Court reasoned that an assessment will be 
valid if it primarily benefits the district and incidentally benefits the entire city, but will not 
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speculation, but it is not necessary that the property directly benefit from 
the assessment.93 
Furthermore, assessment values cannot account for a large 
proportion of the property’s value, nor can they be disproportionately 
larger than other assessments on the property.94  Unless a state statute 
requires a certain formula to determine an assessment’s proportionality, 
local governments can use any equitable method to calculate an 
assessment’s benefits to a property.95  Even if a statute does not proscribe 
a certain formula, the statute might set a maximum assessment amount.  
For example, an assessment may not exceed twenty-five percent of the 
property value.96 Finally, the government may construct the 
                                                                                                             
be valid if it only incidentally benefits the district while primarily benefiting the entire city.  
Fisher, 269 P. at 856–57. 
93 See Kansas City S. Ry. Co. v. Road Improvement Dist. No. 3 of Sevier Cnty. Ark., 266 
U.S. 379, 388 (1924) (upholding an assessment with an indirect benefit because that benefit 
was calculated based on estimations); WHITE, supra note 6, at 16 (warning that benefits 
measured by an estimated increase or decrease in the fair market value of the property 
could lead to “allegations that the assessments are based merely upon speculation or 
conjecture”); see also Hamilton, 112 A. at 836, 839 (reasoning that the “benefit and burden” 
must be reasonably proportionate); Clark v. City of Royal Oak, 38 N.W.2d 413, 418–19 
(Mich. 1949) (holding that drains serve a public benefit because they improve “the 
sanitation and health of the residents” even though the benefit cannot be put in monetary 
terms).  In Hamilton, the Maine Supreme Court found that the proposed improvement was 
beneficial because a new port, combined with Maine’s “advantageous geographical 
position” will lead to more commerce, which in turn will make the state more prosperous 
and increase the general welfare.  112 A. at 839–40. 
94 WHITE, supra note 6, at 16; see Gast Realty & Inv. Co. v. Schneider Granite Co., 240 U.S. 
55, 59 (1916) (explaining that an assessment is invalid if “the parties will be taxed 
disproportionately to each other and to the benefit conferred”); Houck v. Little River 
Drainage Dist., 239 U.S. 254, 265 (1915) (explaining that the assessment must be 
proportional “to position, frontage, area, market value, or to benefits estimated by 
commissioners”); Spring St. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 148 P. 217, 220 (Cal. 1915) 
(invalidating an assessment because it was not proportional); Hamilton, 112 A. at 836 
(explaining that the statute appears to apply a proportional benefit on the assessed 
properties); MCQUILLIN, supra note 86, § 38.37 (explaining that since the assessment amount 
and the value of the benefit must be proportional, a lack of proportionality could constitute 
a confiscation of property in violation of due process of law).  The Maine Supreme Court 
reasoned that the assessment was proportional because of the dramatic increases in 
maritime commerce that would result from the new port and the resulting increases in 
prosperity and welfare.  Hamilton, 112 A. at 839–40. 
95 WHITE, supra note 6, at 16; see MCQUILLIN, supra note 86, § 38.37 (explaining that while 
local governments must consider increases in property values when determining an 
assessment value, they must not limit the analysis to such figures since “benefits cannot 
always be translated into dollar terms” and benefits may only occur at some future time). 
96 See JOHN RAO ET. AL, FORECLOSURES:  DEFENSES, WORKOUTS, AND MORTGAGE 
SERVICING 441 (3d ed. 2010) (explaining that the assessment is levied “at a percentage set by 
statute”); WHITE, supra note 6, at 16 (noting that “express limitations are common . . . as that 
the burden shall not exceed twenty, twenty-five, forty . . . percent of the value of the land or 
property assessed”); see also DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 30, at 3 (suggesting that PACE 
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improvement “without the consent of the particular individuals 
affected.”97  If the government needs the property owners’ consent to 
construct the improvement, it is simply a private improvement that 
cannot be financed by assessment bonds.98 
A large body of case law supports the proposition that a property tax 
assessment legally constitutes a senior lien on a homeowner’s property.99  
For instance, in German Savings & Loan Society v. Ramish, Los Angeles 
residents asked the town to change the street grade to benefit the general 
public.100  The council established a special assessment district 
encompassing the properties along the road to pay the costs of 
upgrading the right-of-way, and charged the project’s costs to the 
                                                                                                             
programs “not exceed [ten percent] of a property’s estimated value”).  Several cases set 
specific percentages.  Cf. Withrow v. City of Nashville, 224 S.W. 614, 614 (Ark. 1920) 
(allowing a 20% limit); City Street Improvement Co. v. Quigley, 215 P. 390, 391 (Cal. 1923) 
(allowing a 50% limit); Uhlenhake v. City of Ossian, 418 N.W.2d 642, 648 (Iowa 1988) 
(allowing a 25% limit); Ward v. City of Louisville, 138 S.W.2d 461, 462 (Ky. 1940) (allowing 
a 75% limit); In re Local Improvement Dist. 417, 268 P. 164, 166 (Wash. 1928) (allowing a 
40% limit). 
97 Halsted, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 642; see also Davis v. McLean Cnty., 204 N.W. 459, 462 (N.D. 
1925) (holding that a voluntary indemnity program did not create a senior tax lien since 
property owners could freely opt into and out of the program).  Twelve years later, the 
North Dakota Supreme Court reasoned that a similar program cannot be classified as either 
a valid tax lien or assessment lien because of the program’s voluntary nature.  Fed. Farm 
Mortg. Corp. v. Falk, 270 N.W. 885, 888 (N.D. 1937).  But see Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. New 
Iberia, 921 F.2d 610, 616 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Company (“FDIC”) could not challenge the validity of a special assessment on property to 
which it held a mortgage because the property owners voluntarily requested the local 
government to impose the assessment). 
98 Halsted, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 642; see also Hamilton, 112 A. at 840 (distinguishing between 
public and private docks and holding that a municipality can only finance construction of a 
public dock). 
99 See generally Guinn v. McReynolds, 170 P. 421 (Cal. 1918) (concluding that tax liens can 
constitute senior liens as long as the legislature gives the liens that priority); German Sav. & 
Loan Soc’y v. Ramish, 69 P. 89, 92 (Cal. 1902) (“The power to levy a tax for general 
purposes, which shall be a lien superior to all other liens prior or otherwise, is not 
doubted . . . .”); People ex. rel Griffin v. Brooklyn, 4 N.Y. 419 (N.Y. 1851) (explaining that tax 
liens are senior to preexisting mortgages).  Some statutes permit “secondary repayment 
sources for assessment financing” to provide security “[i]n addition to the security offered 
by the assessment and consequent lien.”  WHITE, supra note 6, at 17.  White listed “a 
guaranty fund” as one method of secondary security.  Id.  A guaranty fund, sometimes 
called a Loan Loss Reserve Fund (“Reserve Fund”) is an “interest-bearing Deposit 
Account” used to pay shortages in a loan program.  What is the Loan Loss Reserve Fund?, 
13 C.F.R. § 120.710(a) (2010).  Reserve Funds help “achieve economies of scale by 
aggregating projects either geographically or by project type.”  U.S. DEP’T of ENERGY, LOAN 
LOSS RESERVES:  LESSONS FROM THE FIELD (TEXT VERSION) 8 (2010), available at 
http://sustainableconnections.org/energy/energychallenge/loan-loss-reserves. 
100 69 P. 89, 91 (Cal. 1902).  They requested the city council to improve the city streets.  Id. 
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residents in the district.101  Several lots in the district were eventually 
sold because the property owners did not pay bonds issued to finance 
the street improvement.102  The property owners then filed suit for an 
injunction to prevent Los Angeles’ treasurer from deeding the property 
to a third party.103  The California Supreme Court denied the property 
owners’ request and noted that this tax is a lien senior to all other liens so 
that local governments can finance governmental duties.104  The court 
also concluded that maintaining and improving roads is a valid public 
purpose, and it can be financed through a special tax assessment with a 
senior lien provision.105  The court reasoned that because the special 
assessment statute required a senior lien, the parties to a mortgage 
entered into their agreement knowing that the city could impose a senior 
lien on the property.106 
However, another body of state case law supports the proposition 
that a local government cannot classify a lien as a tax lien or a property 
assessment lien when homeowners voluntarily opt into or out of the 
program that imposes the lien.107  In Davis v. McLean County, North 
Dakota passed a statute establishing an “indemnity hail tax” program 
that required homeowners to pay a tax on each acre of their property 
unless they opted out of the program.108  Revenue from this tax went into 
a special fund to indemnify residents whose crops were damaged by 
hail.109  When the homeowners foreclosed on their land, they claimed 
that the hail tax was not a valid tax because it was voluntary, and the 
program did not constitute a senior lien on their property.110  The North 
Dakota Supreme Court agreed with the homeowners, reasoning that 
                                                 
101 Id.  The city council justified creating a special assessment district because road 
improvement provided a public benefit to the local community.  Id. 
102 Id. 
103 See id. at 91–92 (explaining the nature of this injunctive action). 
104 See id. at 92 (explaining that tax liens must be senior to all preexisting and subsequent 
liens so that local governments can “rais[e] revenue . . . to execute the functions of 
government”). 
105 Id.  Specifically, the court noted that “the principles on which the system of general 
taxation depends, and which govern in the enforcement of tax levies for general purposes, 
are also applicable to taxation for the improvement of streets, the construction of sewers, 
and other like public work.”  Id. 
106 See id. at 92 (explaining that “a purchaser takes title with the implied paramount right 
of the public for the uses named”). 
107 See generally Davis v. McLean Cnty., 204 N.W. 459 (N.D. 1925) (invalidating a senior 
lien provision in a voluntary indemnity hail tax provision). 
108 Id. at 459. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 462. 
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because the program operated like a contract between the local 
government and property owners, it did not impose a senior tax lien.111 
More recently, in City of Gainesville v. Florida, the Florida Supreme 
Court ruled that a voluntary storm water management system was a fee 
instead of a special assessment.112  The program imposed a fee on 
Gainesville residents, but residents could opt out if they did not use the 
service.113  The court noted the factors that distinguish fees from 
assessments, and ultimately concluded that this program was a fee.114  
For instance, fees pay for a benefit to a specific property, while 
assessments confer a benefit on a property in a specific area; fees are only 
imposed on participants, while assessments are imposed on everyone.115  
Having explained each of the elements of a valid property assessment 
and the function of tax and assessment liens, the following question 
remains:  Do PACE statutes qualify as valid property assessments that 
enable local governments to impose senior tax liens on participating 
homeowners? 
III.  ANALYSIS 
Before local governments can validly impose property assessment 
liens on participating properties, PACE programs must meet the 
                                                 
111 See id. at 463 (reasoning that the indemnity program is not an actual tax because the 
state does not compel residents to pay; instead residents may voluntarily take part in the 
program).  The court continued that taxes are neither express nor implied contracts 
between parties, but rather “positive acts of the government . . . binding upon the 
inhabitants.”  Id. at 462 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The court specifically noted 
that the government does not need property owners’ consent to impose taxes.  Id.  The 
North Dakota Supreme Court used similar analysis in Federal Farm Mortgage Corp. v. Falk 
twelve years later, invalidating an amended version of the indemnity hail tax statute.  270 
N.W. 885 (N.D. 1937).  The court once again struck down the program, finding that it was 
neither a valid tax nor a valid assessment.  Id. at 888.  The court further reasoned that “the 
Legislature cannot, by mere definition, transform an ordinary debt arising out of a contract 
into a tax.”  Id. at 889. 
112 863 So. 2d 138, 145 (Fla. 2003). 
113 See id. at 146 (noting that the fee only applies to participating properties and not to 
“undeveloped” properties or properties that “implement ways to retain all stormwater on 
site”). 
114 Id. at 144.  The court stated that fees: 
[A]re charged in exchange for a particular governmental service which 
benefits the party paying the fee in a manner not shared by other 
members of society, and they are paid by choice, in that the party 
paying the fee has the option of not utilizing the governmental service 
and thereby avoiding the charge. 
Id. (quoting State v. City of Port Orange, 650 So. 2d. 1, 3 (Fla. 1994)). 
115 See id. at 145 (listing the factors courts must look at when determining if a program is 
an assessment or a fee). 
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following six elements to qualify as valid property assessments.116  The 
Analysis begins, in Part III.A.1, by addressing the first three elements:  
public benefits, local benefits, and benefits conferred to the public at 
large.117  Next, Part III.A.2 examines whether PACE assessments only 
apply to property receiving benefits.118  After that, Part III.A.3 addresses 
whether the PACE assessment is proportional to the value of the 
property and to other assessments.119  The consent element is examined 
in Part III.A.4 to determine whether PACE programs can be imposed 
without the owner’s consent.120  Part III.B.1 reveals that PACE programs 
do not satisfy several of these elements, so local governments cannot 
impose senior liens on participating properties under their assessment 
authority.121  Finally, Part III.B.2 evaluates proposed resolutions to the 
PACE controversy and concludes that none of these solutions adequately 
resolves the dispute.122 
A. PACE Programs do not Fulfill the Requirements of Assessment Districts 
A valid property assessment must include several elements:  it must 
be for a public purpose, provide a local improvement, and benefit the 
public at large.123  Next, the property assessment lien must only be 
applied to properties in the specific geographic area receiving the 
benefit.124  Also, the cost of the assessment to the homeowner must be 
proportional to the value of the assessed property.125  Finally, the 
municipality does not need to obtain a homeowner’s consent before 
                                                 
116 See supra Part II.D (listing the elements for an assessment). 
117 See infra Part III.A.1 (analyzing whether PACE programs provide public benefits to 
the specific area assessed instead of private benefits). 
118 See infra Part III.A.2 (analyzing whether the program applies to all residents in an 
area). 
119 See infra Part III.A.3 (analyzing whether the assessment is proportional to the value of 
the property and to other liens on the assessed property). 
120 See infra Part III.A.4 (analyzing whether these programs are voluntary). 
121 See infra Part III.B.1 (explaining that local governments can only impose senior liens 
under their assessment authority if the program meets all the requirements of a valid 
assessment). 
122 See infra Part III.B.2 (analyzing the effectiveness of solutions currently being proposed 
by supporters and opponents of PACE programs). 
123 See supra note 91 (explaining that property assessments can only finance projects that 
result in public benefits to the community at large and not projects that primarily benefit 
private individuals). 
124 See supra note 92 (explaining that local governments can only apply assessments to 
properties that are benefited from the improvement and explaining the policy rationale 
behind this requirement). 
125 See supra notes 94–96 and accompanying text (explaining the proportionality 
requirement and also describing various ways of measuring an assessment’s 
proportionality). 
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imposing a property assessment.126  If a program satisfies each of these 
elements, the program qualifies as a property assessment, and the 
municipality can validly impose a senior lien on the assessed 
properties.127  PACE programs meet few of these elements because they 
have unique features, which distinguish them from traditional property 
assessments. 
1. PACE Programs Serve a Public Purpose and Confer Local Benefits to 
the Public at Large 
At the threshold level, PACE programs must be for a public purpose 
and provide benefits both to the public at large and to the assessed 
property.128  Property assessments have financed many different types of 
public projects, and many early cases upheld a local government’s ability 
to finance projects ranging from road and sidewalk improvements to the 
construction of public docks using property assessments.129  More 
recently, municipalities have used property assessments to finance 
improvements on private property.130  Cities in California finance seismic 
retrofits on buildings to make them more resistant to earthquakes, and 
Massachusetts replaces property owners’ septic tanks using assessments 
with optional senior lien provisions.131 
In the above examples, the public benefits of improved roads, 
sidewalks, and new docks are clear:  residents are able to travel with 
greater ease; however, courts have limited such projects to public 
projects.132  Both California and Massachusetts provide public benefits 
beyond that of property improvements.  When buildings receive 
                                                 
126 See supra notes 107–15 (explaining that assessments cannot depend on the consent of 
homeowners). 
127 See supra notes 86–87 (explaining that local governments can make assessment liens 
senior to all preexisting mortgages and liens under its assessment authority). 
128 See supra notes 91–92 and accompanying text (listing the elements of an assessment 
and explaining the public purpose and public benefit elements). 
129 See COUGHLIN ET AL., supra note 19, at 2 (noting that local governments often use 
special assessments to finance road improvements, “bury[] power lines, [and] extend[] 
public services into neighborhoods”). 
130 See generally supra note 80 (listing types of improvements to private property, 
including “seismic improvements, geologic hazard abatement and . . . septic tank 
replacement”). 
131 See FREE LIBRARY, supra note 80 (reporting on the California Infrastructure and 
Economic Development Bank Bay Area’s Toll Bridge’s plan to make two bond issues, one 
with a senior lien priority and one with a junior lien priority to finance bridge upgrades); 
MASS. DEP’T ENVTL. PROTECTION, supra note 31 (describing Betterment agreements that 
allow homeowners to obtain financing from local governments for septic replacements).  
The Bay Area Plan’s second lien priority is significant because it shows that junior liens are 
a feasible means of raising revenue.  FREE LIBRARY, supra note 80. 
132 See supra notes 90–91 (describing the distinction between public and private benefits). 
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upgrades, those buildings will sustain less damage in an earthquake and 
reduce property damage to the community as a whole.133  Furthermore, 
septic tank improvements would reduce the danger of sewage leaching 
into the land and polluting neighboring residents’ water supplies.134 
Although the above mentioned benefits are undisputed, the public 
benefits resulting from PACE programs are less clear.  For instance, 
proponents claim that PACE programs will benefit individual property 
owners by improving the exact value of their property and reducing 
utility bills, which is a dubious claim at best, because no one can 
accurately predict the value of a home until the property is sold.135  
Nonetheless, PACE proponents assert that individuals looking to buy a 
house will be more willing to buy an energy-efficient home with solar 
panels and will pay more for these houses than for comparable houses 
without solar panels.136  Homeowners would certainly like to sell their 
homes for more money, but benefits based on projected increases in 
property values are not likely to survive judicial scrutiny because 
benefits cannot be based on mere conjecture.137  Improvements to 
increase property values seem to be private improvements, like the 
proposed construction of a private dock in Hamilton v. Portland Pier Site 
                                                 
133 See supra note 31 (discussing seismic upgrades in California). 
134 See supra note 31 (discussing septic tank replacement in Massachusetts). 
135 See ZIMRING & FULLER, supra note 4, at 3 (“[E]nergy savings [from solar panel 
installation] will offset and, in some cases, exceed the assessment payments,” thereby 
reducing the risk of default on the PACE assessment); NAT’L RES. DEF. COUNCIL, supra note 
33, at 4 (claiming that PACE programs will give homeowners more disposable income 
since “lower utility bills offset the cost of the assessment”).  But see Cent. Sav. Bank v. City 
of New York, 18 N.E.2d 151, 155–56 (N.Y. 1938) (noting that expenditures “may or may not 
add anything to the land value, and on foreclosure sale might not bring one penny more to 
the mortgagee”); Felt, supra note 7, at 9 (arguing that since “the entire balance of the loan 
remains as an encumbrance on the property, continuing to impair the value of the 
mortgagee’s collateral and lowering the amount available to mortgagees in a 
foreclosure . . . or other resolution of defaulting mortgage” the claim that PACE programs 
improve the value of property is highly suspect). 
136 See ELKIND ET AL., supra note 4, at 15 (asserting that solar panels would increase 
demand for homes and homes would sell for more money than comparable houses without 
solar panels).  But see Felt, supra note 7, at 3 (explaining that projected increases in property 
values are speculative because these “improvements do not increase the value of property 
dollar for dollar”).  Projected increases in property values are suspect for another reason:  if 
homeowners do not maintain and repair their solar panels, these improvements might be 
“worthless long before the PACE loan is paid.”  Id. 
137 See supra note 93 and accompanying text (explaining that assessments do not need to 
directly benefit the property, but should be based on something other than projected 
increases in fair market value); see also Kansas City S. Ry. Co. v. Road Improvement Dist. 
No. 3, 266 U.S. 379, 387–88 (1924) (explaining that assessments can be “based on a solid 
premise of fact and experience,” but not on “mere speculation and conjecture”).  In Kansas 
City Southern Railway Co., the U.S. Supreme Court upheld an assessment because the 
benefits were based on reasonable increases in railroad traffic.  Id. at 388. 
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District.138  Homeowners can enjoy the same “right to the exclusive 
enjoyment of the structure” as the dock owners in Hamilton.139  The 
Maine Supreme Court found that justification insufficient, and a court 
would likely find the same justification insufficient as applied to PACE 
programs. 
PACE supporters also assert that solar retrofits financed through 
PACE programs benefit the environment as a whole, because clean 
energy, such as solar power, reduces the nation’s dependence on fossil 
fuels, which in turn reduces greenhouse gas emissions and global 
warming.140  A court might find combating global warming to be a 
public benefit, even though the benefit is more tenuous than street 
improvements or seismic upgrades, because courts give great deference 
to legislative findings of public benefits when those benefits are based on 
measurable criteria.141 
In addition to serving a public purpose and providing a public 
benefit, PACE programs must provide a local benefit to constitute a valid 
property assessment.142  The benefit can come in the form of any of the 
benefits mentioned in Part III.B.1, but it must specifically apply to the 
properties in the assessed district.143  PACE programs do not meet these 
requirements.  Although they provide jobs for local construction 
companies and reduce greenhouse gas emissions in local communities, 
these benefits are not specific to the properties assessed; they benefit the 
                                                 
138 In Hamilton, the Maine Supreme Court invalidated a plan to finance a private dock 
because the owners of the dock enjoyed exclusive access to the dock.  112 A. 836, 840 (Me. 
1921).  Similarly, PACE programs finance private improvements because homeowners 
enjoy exclusive access to their home.  Id. 
139 Id. 
140 See DeVries & Lynch, supra note 5, at 2 and accompanying text (explaining that PACE 
programs can reduce greenhouse gas emissions and combat global warming). 
141 See Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 266 U.S. at 388 (upholding an assessment with an indirect 
benefit because that benefit was calculated based on “forecast and estimate”).  Decreases in 
greenhouse gas emissions, and a resulting reduction in global warming are indirectly 
related to PACE programs, but these benefits are calculated based on forecasts and 
estimates of reductions.  Id.  Therefore, the global warming rationale would likely fall 
within Kansas City Southern Railway Co.’s “forecast and estimate” standard and be upheld.  
Id. 
142 See City of Whittier v. Dixon, 151 P.2d 5, 7 (Cal. 1944) (holding that “a special 
assessment is justified if the improvement is a public one and the property to be assessed will 
receive a special benefit”) (emphasis added); Irish v. Hahn, 281 P. 385, 387 (Cal. 1929) (noting 
that one of the limitations on a municipality’s assessment power is “that the 
improvement . . . must confer a special benefit upon the property assessed”). 
143 See supra notes 90–91 (explaining that to meet the public purpose requirement, 
assessments must benefit the public within the assessment district and confer a specific 
benefit on the assessed property). 
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community as a whole.144  Homeowners who otherwise would not be 
able to finance these improvements are able to obtain financing through 
PACE programs, but this benefit fails the public benefit requirement so it 
cannot be used as a justification.145  For these reasons, courts would 
likely find that PACE programs do not serve a public purpose or provide 
a local benefit to the public at large.146  The remaining elements do not 
fare any better. 
2. PACE Assessments do not Apply to All Properties in a Distinct 
Geographic Area 
Typical property assessments, or special assessments, are only 
applied to residents living in a distinct geographic area receiving the 
benefit of the assessment.147  For example, if a local government widens 
A Street, the local government can impose a special assessment on all 
                                                 
144 See supra note 91 (explaining that special assessments may incidentally benefit the 
community at large as long as it primarily benefits the assessed property and as long as the 
local benefit is distinguished from the general benefit); see also NAT’L RES. DEF. COUNCIL, 
supra note 33, at 3 (claiming that PACE programs can lead to “[s]ignificant job creation” 
because even “[m]odest implementation nationally for PACE financing of solar PV and 
energy efficiency retrofits can create about 160,000 long-term, green jobs for our 
economy . . . in the communities that adopt PACE”).  Additionally, according to PACE 
supporters, these programs can lead to a “[s]ubstantial reduction in greenhouse gas 
emissions” because “[a] standard retrofit package in an individual home can reduce CO2 
emissions by 60–100 tons over its useful life.”  Id.  Global warming is being blamed for 
“melting glaciers, droughts, [and] plumes of jellyfish devastating fisheries, . . . dramatic 
wildfires plaguing much of the West and drought affecting large swaths of the Southeast 
and West.”  DeVries & Lynch, supra note 5, at 3. 
145 See NAT’L RES. DEF. COUNCIL, supra note 33, at 4 (noting that PACE programs are 
available to “[m]any segments of society that are underserved by traditional financial 
options”).  PACE supporters also claim that “PACE can be a smart choice for homeowners 
of all income levels.”  Id.  However, PACE supporters are quick to note that homeowners of 
all income levels can benefit from PACE programs, which they allege minimizes the risks 
to mortgage holders of moral hazard and adverse selection.  Id.  They claim that “[a]dverse 
selection would occur if, out of the pool of potential participants, only the weakest and 
most likely to go delinquent would apply.”  Id.  “Moral hazard would occur if, either 
directly or indirectly, participation in the program would actually increase the likelihood of 
nonpayment.”  Id. 
146 See DeVries & Lynch, supra note 5, at 3 (noting that “courts defer to legislative bodies 
in their declaration of a public purpose” and that courts have broadly defined public 
purposes). 
147 See supra note 92 (explaining that assessments can only apply to property receiving the 
benefit and citing relevant case law for this proposition).  For instance, the property must 
be either “actually or presumptively” benefited to be included in the assessment district, 
but “the property can be presumed to have received an especial benefit.”  Halsted v. 
Sacramento, 52 Cal. Rptr. 637, 642 (Cal. Ct. App. 1966) (emphasis omitted). 
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residents living on A Street.148  Conversely, the government cannot 
impose the assessment on residents of Z Street on the other side of town 
because those residents are not living within the assessment district.149  
However, if the program applies on a house-by-house basis depending 
on whether the property owners opt in, the program is more like a fee 
than an assessment.150  PACE assessments only apply to residents who 
take part in the program, regardless of where they live.151  PACE 
programs are different from normal assessment programs because 
residents in the PACE assessment district do not necessarily live along 
one street or on one city block.152  Residents are included in the PACE 
assessment district on a house-by-house basis, rather than a block-by-
block or street-by-street basis.153  This means that PACE programs are 
more like fees than special assessments.154 
3. The Value of the Improvement is Proportional to the Property’s 
Value 
The value of property assessments must be proportional to both the 
value of the property and to other assessments on the property.155  In 
                                                 
148 See Halsted, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 642 (explaining that the assessments can only be levied on 
houses that benefit from the improvement). 
149 See also STONE & YOUNGBERG, supra note 81 (explaining that municipalities create 
assessment districts in a certain portion of the city and the district encompasses houses 
within that portion of the city). 
150 See supra notes 114–15 (explaining the distinction between fees and assessments). 
151 See DeVries & Lynch, supra note 5, at 4 (explaining that “PACE programs are entirely 
voluntary” and therefore the programs do not apply to residents who choose not to “opt-in” 
to the program) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted); FULLER, supra note 
29, at 27 (explaining that property is not assessed unless the “owner ‘opts-in’”). 
152 See generally FULLER, supra note 29, at 27 (comparing typical assessment districts where 
“the governing body must designate the geographic boundaries of the district, and all 
parcels of property on the tax roll for such designated area are included in the district” 
with PACE assessment districts, which require property owners to opt-into the program 
before becoming part of the assessment district). 
153 See supra note 24 (explaining that since PACE programs are voluntary, individual 
households determine whether they want to voluntarily opt into the program); cf. German 
Sav. & Loan Soc’y v. Ramish, 69 P. 89, 91 (Cal. 1902) (holding that all residents on the street 
are required to be members of the assessment district).  For purposes of this element, the 
distinction between a house-by-house assessment and a block-by-block assessment is 
immaterial because the assessment district only consists of residents who receive the 
program’s benefits.  Id. 
154 See supra note 115 (explaining that fees apply only to property owners who opt into a 
program while assessments apply to all residents in a given district). 
155 See WHITE, supra note 6, at 16 (explaining that the assessment must be proportionate 
not only to the benefit conferred on the property, but also must be “proportionate to other 
property assessments”); see also Gast Realty & Inv. Co. v. Schneider Granite Co., 240 U.S. 
55, 59 (1916) (explaining that an assessment is invalid if “the parties will be taxed 
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other words, the assessment typically cannot account for more than a 
particular percentage of the property’s value.156  This requirement has 
strong practical considerations because a lien on a property, whether 
arising from an assessment or a loan, is difficult to pay off if it is worth 
more than a small percentage of the property.157 
PACE programs that adhere to the DOE’s Best Practices Guidelines 
also have strict loan limits.158  The Guidelines specifically suggest that 
PACE assessments not account for more than ten percent of the 
property’s value.159  These DOE Guidelines satisfy the proportionality 
requirement for property assessments, and provide more protection than 
is typically required by case law.160  While PACE programs satisfy the 
proportionality requirement, they fail the consent element.161 
                                                                                                             
disproportionately to each other and to the benefit conferred”); Houck v. Little River 
Drainage Dist., 239 U.S. 254, 265 (1915) (“The state in its discretion may lay such 
assessments in proportion to position, frontage, area, market value, or to benefits estimated 
by commissioners.”); Martin, 205 U.S. at 140 (explaining that an assessment statute is valid 
if “the apportionment is . . . limited to the benefit”).  Courts have upheld various formulae 
used to calculate proportionality.  Id. 
156 See WHITE, supra note 6, at 16 (explaining that statutes often contain “express 
limitations” mandating that the burden “shall not exceed” a certain percentage of the 
property’s value).  Often, property assessments cannot account for more than twenty-five 
percent of a property’s value, though some case authority allows assessments to account 
for as much as seventy-five percent of the property’s value.  MCQUILLIN, supra note 86; see 
also supra note 96 (providing case law for twenty, twenty-five, and forty percent limits). 
157 See STONE & YOUNGBERG, supra note 81 (advising potential investors on how to invest 
in municipal investment bonds). 
158 See, e.g., DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 30 (setting forth suggested loan guidelines to 
ensure that PACE loans offer more protection to preexisting mortgage holders). 
159 See id. at 3 (suggesting that “PACE assessments should generally not exceed 10% of 
property’s estimated value (i.e. a property value-to-lien ratio of 10:1”)).  The Guidelines 
further recommend that “assessments should . . . not be issued for projects below a 
minimum cost threshold of approximately $2500 [to] . . . ensure that improvements are 
‘right-sized’ for properties and for the administrative costs of . . . PACE programs.”  Id.  
Opponents counter that these protections are not adequate because PACE liens still 
subordinate preexisting mortgages and interests, which lowers the value of those interests.  
Felt, supra note 7, at 3.  PACE loans increase the LTV ratio of the first mortgage.  Id.  The 
LTV “is the ratio of the amount of the mortgage loan to the value of the home that provides 
collateral.  The higher the LTV, the less valuable is the mortgage. . . . [E]very PACE loan 
that is made on a mortgaged property will” substantially decrease the value of preexisting 
mortgages.  Id. 
160 See DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 30, at 3 (urging ten percent limits on PACE 
assessments); cf. Withrow v. City of Nashville, 224 S.W. 614, 614 (Ark. 1920) (allowing a 
twenty percent limit); City St. Improvement Co. v. Quigley, 215 P. 390, 391 (Cal. 1923) 
(allowing a fifty percent limit); Uhlenhake v. City of Ossian, 418 N.W.2d 642, 648 (Iowa 
1988) (allowing a twenty-five percent limit); Ward v. City of Louisville, 138 S.W.2d 461, 462 
(Ky. 1940) (allowing a seventy-five percent limit); In re Local Improvement Dist. 417, 268 P. 
164, 166 (Wash. 1928) (allowing a forty percent limit). 
161 See supra notes 90–98 and accompanying text (describing the elements of valid 
property assessments). 
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4. PACE Programs Fail the Consent Element 
PACE programs do not satisfy the final requirement either because 
they require the property owner’s consent.162  Early cases clearly 
establish that property assessments cannot be dependent on the property 
owner’s consent.163  In other words, if a property owner must consent to 
an “assessment,” the program must be classified as a loan or a fee.164  
PACE proponents correctly analogize PACE programs to the voluntary 
Massachusetts septic tank replacement programs.165  However, these 
programs have not been challenged in court, so there is no case law 
upholding their voluntary nature.166  PACE programs are more like fees 
than assessments because they only apply to homeowners who 
participate.167  The only case law dealing with voluntary property 
assessment programs strikes down those programs, and PACE programs 
                                                 
162 See supra notes 90–98 (listing the elements of a valid property assessment). 
163 See Davis v. McLean Cnty., 204 N.W. 459, 463–64 (N.D. 1925) (analyzing the validity of 
voluntary “assessments”).  In Davis, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that a voluntary 
indemnity insurance program was not a valid tax because residents could voluntarily opt-
into the program.  Id. at 463.  In a subsequent case, the North Dakota Supreme Court held 
that an amended program could not be classified as a property assessment with senior lien 
provisions, again because the program was voluntary.  Fed. Farm Mortg. Corp. v. Falk, 270 
N.W. 885, 889 (N.D. 1937).  These invalid hail insurance programs are analogous to PACE 
programs since both programs allow property owners to decide whether they want to take 
part in the program.  Id. 
164 See Halsted v. Sacramento, 52 Cal. Rptr. 637, 642 (Cal. Ct. App. 1966) (“[T]he public, 
acting through its government, may construct [the improvement] without the consent of 
the particular individuals affected.”).  If this element is absent, the program “is essentially a 
private improvement” and the local government cannot use its property assessment 
authority to finance the improvement “no matter how useful or advantageous it may be” to 
the property owners.  Id. 
165 See MASS. DEP’T ENVTL. PROT., supra note 31 (describing the requirements of 
Betterment Agreements).  Like PACE programs, Betterment Agreements are “[f]inancial 
[a]greement[s] between a homeowner and the community.”  Id.  Also like PACE programs, 
the local government pays the upfront costs of septic improvements and the homeowner 
repays the local government through a line item on the property tax.  Id.  Finally, if the 
homeowner does not repay the loan, the local government may obtain a senior “municipal 
lien” on the property to obtain repayment from the homeowner.  Id.  In all relevant aspects, 
Massachusetts’s Betterment Agreements are identical to PACE programs.  See supra notes 
23–37 and accompanying text (describing the features of PACE programs). 
166 The author utilized a Westlaw and Lexis search using the terms “Betterment 
Agreement!” and lien on October 22, 2011.  This search retrieved no cases.  The author ran 
this search to find any cases challenging the legal authority of Massachusetts’ Betterment 
Agreements, but because he found no cases, it appears these programs have not been 
challenged yet. 
167 See supra notes 114–15 (comparing assessments to the fee programs in City of 
Gainesville). 
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would likely suffer a similar fate.168  According to PACE proponents, a 
major selling point of the program is its voluntary nature, but this 
provision will ultimately be PACE programs’ undoing.169 
B. PACE Programs do not Meet the Requirements for Valid Assessments 
As the above analysis indicates, PACE programs fail to satisfy 
several elements; thus, they cannot be classified as property assessments 
with senior lien provisions.170  PACE programs meet the proportionality 
requirement because the assessment value is proportional to the value of 
the property.171  They also arguably serve a public purpose, but they 
benefit private individuals instead of providing a local benefit for the 
public.172  PACE liens are only applied to property if the property owner 
participates in the program, not to all properties in a distinct geographic 
area.173  However, the programs also fail the test for a valid assessment, 
because PACE statutes expressly require that the programs be 
voluntary.174  Well-settled case law establishes the principle that 
programs requiring property owners’ consent cannot be labeled property 
assessments with senior lien provisions.175  As such, PACE programs 
                                                 
168 See supra notes 107–15 (explaining the reasons for invalidating voluntary programs in 
Davis and City of Gainesville). 
169 See DeVries & Lynch, supra note 5, at 4 (explaining that PACE programs benefit from 
the voluntary lien provisions because homeowners who do not wish to take part in the 
program are not burdened in any way). 
170 See supra note 97 (explaining that assessments cannot turn on a property owner’s 
consent).  PACE proponents argue that PACE programs are not the only examples of 
voluntary assessments, saying that “in California, land-secured financing districts are 
commonly used by land developers, who voluntarily assess their undeveloped property to 
finance the public improvements.”  DeVries & Lynch, supra note 5, at 5.  However, 
voluntarily creating a district is distinct from voluntarily opting into or out of a district.  Id.  
Indeed, in German Savings & Loan Society v. Ramish, the court noted that the residents who 
opposed the district could have voiced their opposition before the city created the district 
and could have prevented the city from creating the district.  69 P. 89, 92 (Cal. 1902). 
171 See supra Part III.A.3 (explaining that PACE programs are proportional to the value of 
the assessed property and to other liens on that property, thus satisfying this requirement 
for a valid assessment). 
172 See supra Part III.A.1 (explaining that, while a court might find PACE programs are for 
a public purpose, they will find that the programs do not provide a local benefit and 
instead benefit the general public). 
173 See supra Part III.A.2 (explaining that PACE programs apply only to property if the 
owner opts into the program, and not to all properties in the area). 
174 See supra Part III.A.4 (explaining that PACE programs are strictly voluntary, thus 
failing the requirement that assessments not be voluntary). 
175 See supra notes 107–11 and accompanying text (stating that property taxes are not 
voluntary; rather a property tax must be imposed by the government without the owner’s 
consent, as explained in Davis v. McLean County); see also Fed. Farm Mortg. Corp. v. Falk, 
270 N.W. 885, 889 (N.D. 1937) (explaining that voluntary programs with senior lien 
repayment provisions exceed a local government’s assessment authority and are invalid). 
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cannot impose a senior lien on participating properties under the guise 
of a property assessment or special assessment.176 
1. Voluntary PACE Loans Cannot Receive Senior Tax Lien Status 
The “first in time, first in right” principle is the general rule 
governing mortgages, where the first mortgage or lien on a property 
receives senior lien status; however, there are several exceptions to this 
general rule.177  Local governments can make tax or assessment liens 
senior to all other preexisting or subsequent liens.178  This exception is 
justified because local governments must be able to receive money owed 
to them by property owners in the event of a default, because the local 
government finances projects of general public benefit.179  Other 
taxpayers and residents should not be left financing the portion of a 
public project that a delinquent property owner should have paid.180 
This policy rationale does not extend to private loans, even if those 
private loans are obtained through the local government for an 
ostensibly public purpose, like PACE projects.181  Private loans must 
generally adhere to the “first in time, first in right” principle.182  As such, 
property owners can freely opt into PACE programs, but they must do 
so under the assumption that the PACE lien will be junior and 
subordinate to any preexisting mortgages and liens.183  The majority of 
                                                 
176 See supra notes 163–69 (analyzing the essential consent requirement of property 
assessments, and concluding that PACE programs ultimately fail this requirement). 
177 See supra note 84 and accompanying text (explaining that the “first in time first in 
right” principle is the general rule and as a result, earlier mortgages and property interests 
receive priority over subsequent property interests).  But see supra note 84 (explaining that 
this general rule is subject to a “multitude of limitations”). 
178 See MCQUILLIN, supra note 86, § 44.142 (explaining that the general legislative policy 
has been to regard municipal taxes as liens superior in point of payment to all other liens); 
supra notes 86–87 (explaining that the legislature has the full power to set tax lien priorities, 
and can legitimately make these liens superior to all prior property interests). 
179 See supra note 87 (explaining the policy rationale behind senior tax liens). 
180 See WHITE, supra note 6, at 8 (offering perhaps the best example of residents being 
forced to repay bonds that should have been repaid by another entity).  Municipalities 
aided railroads by financing railroad improvements through bond issues, but mismanaged 
railroads went out of business and taxpayers were left repaying the bond long after the 
railroad’s benefits were gone.  Id. 
181 See supra note 87 (explaining that tax liens receive a senior lien status to ensure that 
local governments can finance their operations).  The North Dakota Supreme Court 
reasoned that if a program is not a tax, “then the [l]egislature cannot, by designating it as a 
tax, give it any greater preference as a lien than could be given it should no such name be 
affixed to it.”  Davis v. McLean Cnty., 204 N.W. 459, 464 (N.D. 1925). 
182 See supra note 84 (explaining that although the “first in time, first in right” principle is 
“subject to a ‘multitude of limitations,’” it is the “general rule”). 
183 See supra note 84 (explaining that the “first in time, first in right” principle is the basic 
rule governing mortgage seniority). 
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PACE statutes instead allow local governments to impose senior liens to 
ensure payback of these voluntary loans, which has led to the dispute 
between PACE proponents and the GSEs.184 
2. No Proposed Solution Adequately Addresses the Concerns of All 
Stakeholders 
The simple solution to the lien seniority problem appears to be the 
one advocated by the GSEs:  amend the state statutes to make PACE 
liens junior and subordinate to preexisting property interests, including 
mortgages.185  This solution would be relatively simple to implement—
state legislatures would essentially strike one phrase, or sometimes even 
one word, from state statutes.  However, this seemingly simple solution 
would open up more problems from a practical standpoint. 
For example, once PACE programs implement a junior lien 
repayment provision, PACE bonds, which raise the initial capital for the 
solar energy retrofits, will drop from AAA status to junk bond status.186  
PACE supporters argue that this change will cause investors to shy away 
from PACE bonds as an investment tool.187  Although this distinction 
would not affect the legality of PACE programs, it would create 
significant financial barriers.188  For instance, if investors shy away from 
PACE programs with junior lien repayment provisions, PACE programs 
will likely remain unfunded, and the programs’ many environmental 
benefits will continue to go unrealized.189  This is certainly not a viable 
                                                 
184 See supra note 38 and accompanying text (explaining that most state statutes impose a 
senior lien repayment provision); supra note 40 and accompanying text (explaining that 
Maine’s statute is the one notable exception to the senior lien repayment method because 
Maine’s statute specifically requires a subordinate lien repayment system); see also supra 
note 36 (listing statutes, including Wisconsin’s statute, which describe PACE programs as 
loans); supra note 34 (listing statutes that specifically mention the voluntary nature of these 
programs). 
185 See supra notes 41–44 (reporting the GSEs’ requests that PACE loans achieve a 
subordinate lien status). 
186 See supra note 80 (explaining that the difference between AAA bonds and junk bonds 
is based on the bond’s repayment provisions). 
187 See supra note 81 (explaining why investors will hesitate to invest in junk bonds with 
junior lien repayment provisions); see also Barclay’s Letter, supra note 83 (applying these 
concerns to PACE bonds).  According to Barclay’s Capital, PACE bonds will not be an 
attractive investment if they have subordinate lien provisions because they will not be 
investment grade.  Id. 
188 See supra note 81 (explaining that since investors will hesitate to invest in junk bonds, 
PACE programs are likely to go unfunded). 
189 See DeVries & Lynch, supra note 5, at 7 (explaining that local governments will not be 
able to raise enough revenue to fund solar retrofits if PACE programs do not have senior 
lien provisions).  They go on to claim that if mortgages are senior to PACE liens, ensuring 
repayment “would be impracticable if not impossible.”  Id.; see also July 14, 2010 FHFA 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 46, No. 1 [2011], Art. 8
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol46/iss1/8
2011] Slowing the PACE of Recovery 301 
solution to the PACE issue; even the GSEs point out that they support 
measures to help the environment as long as those measures do not 
affect their contract rights.190 
Once a decision is announced in California ex rel Brown v. FHFA, all 
interested parties will have a better idea whether PACE programs 
constitute valid property assessments with senior lien provisions.191  
However, the court system moves notoriously slow, as former California 
Attorney General Brown acknowledged before filing the case.192  
Furthermore, similar cases have been filed in other circuits, which raises 
the possibility of a circuit split on the issue.193  If that occurs, the 
mortgage industry will not have a definitive answer unless the Supreme 
Court takes up the issue.  In the meantime, the legality of the senior lien 
provisions will remain uncertain, and stakeholders will hesitate to invest 
in PACE programs.194 
Congressional efforts to resolve this issue ultimately proved 
unfruitful for the following practical and political reasons.  As a practical 
matter, the bills introduced by Congressman Mike Thompson and 
Senator Barbara Boxer sought to amend the GSEs’ lending standards to 
encompass programs like PACE.195  This would prevent Fannie Mae, 
Freddie Mac, and the FHFA from rejecting home mortgages with PACE 
liens, but it would not solve the underlying structural problems caused 
                                                                                                             
Press Release, supra note 43 (claiming that PACE programs are currently dead because of 
the legal uncertainty surrounding the senior lien provisions). 
190 See July 6, 2010 FHFA Press Release, supra note 8 (reaffirming its commitment “to 
work[] with federal, state, and local government agencies to develop and implement 
energy retrofit lending programs with appropriate underwriting guidelines and consumer 
protection standards”); see also Fannie Mae Letter, supra note 42  (emphasis added) (stating 
that Fannie Mae is “willing to engage with federal and state agencies as they consider 
sustainable programs to facilitate lending for energy-efficiency home retrofits, while 
preserving the status of mortgage loans originated as first liens”); Freddie Mac Letter, supra note 
42 (supporting “the goal of encouraging responsible financing of energy efficient and 
renewable energy home improvements”). 
191 See supra notes 53–57 and accompanying text (explaining that former California 
Attorney General Brown filed suit in federal district court seeking declaratory judgment 
against the FHFA to declare that PACE programs are not loans, but rather valid property 
assessments and do not violate the FHFA’s lending standards). 
192 See supra note 53 (quoting Brown as urging the FHFA to work with California to 
resolve the issue before he filed suit because the suit would be more time consuming). 
193 See supra note 53 (listing the other cases filed in federal district court). 
194 See supra note 55 (explaining that there is uncertainty surrounding PACE programs 
and advising potential investors to avoid PACE programs until the legal issues are 
resolved). 
195 See supra note 61 (quoting the bills, which seek to amend the lending standards to 
comply with PACE program requirements as elaborated in the DOE’s Best Practices 
Guidelines). 
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by PACE programs.196  These programs would still represent another 
property interest that could push a homeowner’s mortgage further 
underwater and lead to default.197  From a political standpoint, the 111th 
Congressional Term is over and neither bill cleared its respective 
committee, which means each must be reintroduced in the 112th Term 
before it can be voted on.  The measures gathered only meager support 
from the Democrat-controlled Congress, and will likely gather even less 
support now that Republicans control the House of Representatives.198  
Any Congressional resolution, however ineffective, is highly unlikely.  
Therefore, the burden of resolving this controversy falls on state 
legislatures to amend state statutes in a far more comprehensive manner. 
IV.  CONTRIBUTION 
PACE programs are not valid property assessments, so local 
governments cannot use their traditional property assessment authority 
to impose senior lien provisions for PACE programs.199  This means that 
PACE statutes must be amended to avoid interfering with mortgagors’ 
contract rights. 200  State legislatures must strike the senior lien provisions 
altogether and adopt a junior lien provision with a loan loss reserve fund 
for secondary repayment.  North Carolina and Hawaii have 
experimented with this method of repayment for their PACE 
programs.201  Although these programs are too new to provide extensive 
empirical data as to their effectiveness, Reserve Funds have been used 
successfully in similar situations.202 
State legislatures must enact a comprehensive PACE reform statute 
with multiple structural changes to adequately resolve the PACE 
                                                 
196 See supra note 42 and accompanying text (explaining that the FHFA objects to PACE 
programs because they represent loans without sound underwriting standards). 
197 See supra note 74 (describing how PACE loans raise the LTV ratio and could lead to 
default). 
198 See supra note 65 (noting that the bills have few co-sponsors, and no Republican co-
sponsors). 
199 See supra Part III (analyzing PACE programs and concluding that they are not valid 
property assessments with senior lien provisions). 
200 For purposes of this Contribution, the relevant portions of Maine’s PACE statute serve 
as the basis for the proposed Model PACE Statute with amended provisions in italics.  The 
relevant portions of Maine’s statute are ME. REV. STAT. tit. 35-A, §§ 10155 and 10156.  The 
Model Statute keeps the same numbering for clarity’s sake and is cited as MOD. REV. STAT. 
tit. 35-A, §§ 10155 and 10156. 
201 See supra note 37 (explaining that North Carolina and Hawaii have adopted a 
Revolving Loan Fund provision as an alternate method of repayment). 
202 See supra note 99 (explaining that Reserve Funds help insure that investors in 
assessment bonds receive a return on their investment); see also supra note 5 (explaining that 
homeowners often need local government assistance to finance these programs). 
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controversy.  As a preliminary matter, these proposed amendments can 
only be applied prospectively and not to preexisting PACE loans.203  
Stringent underwriting and program design requirements to satisfy the 
mortgage industry’s concerns are proposed in Part IV.B.204  Next, states 
should create a third-party trust to manage the collection of PACE 
loans.205  Furthermore, it is vital that PACE loans follow the “first in time, 
first in right” principle, but Part IV.D proposes an optional senior lien 
provision if certain requirements are met.206  Finally, the creation of a 
loan loss reserve fund is proposed in Part IV.E to ensure that subordinate 
PACE loans are fully repaid in the event of a default.207  While these 
amendments can resolve the PACE controversy, they cannot apply 
retroactively without causing additional problems. 
A. All Amendments to PACE Statutes Must Apply Prospectively 
The GSEs and the mortgage industry oppose PACE loan programs 
because these programs interfere with their contract rights by 
subordinating their senior mortgages to PACE loans.208  If states amend 
their PACE statutes to apply to preexisting PACE loans, the statutes will 
still interfere with contract rights.  This time the PACE statutes will 
interfere with the contract rights of people who invested in PACE bonds.  
These investors purchased PACE bonds with the expectation that the 
PACE liens would be repaid first in a foreclosure and that they would 
receive a return on their investment.  If existing PACE loans are 
subordinated, the investors might not receive a return on their 
investment.209 
Therefore, the GSEs should agree to honor all PACE loans already in 
existence on the condition that all future PACE loans will apply the “first 
in time, first in right” principle.  The FHFA offered to honor these 
                                                 
203 See infra Part IV.A (explaining that if amended PACE statutes applied retroactively, 
they would impact the contract rights of homeowners who already entered into a PACE 
loan). 
204 See infra Part IV.B (proposing underwriting criteria that comply with the FHFA’s 
lending standards). 
205 See infra Part IV.C (proposing that states establish a trust to free local governments 
from the burden of collecting PACE loans). 
206 See infra Part IV.D (proposing PACE statutes adhere to the “first in time, first in right” 
principle). 
207 See infra Part IV.E (proposing a loan loss reserve fund to ensure investors get a return 
on their investment). 
208 See supra note 42 (explaining the concerns of the GSEs and the mortgage industry); see 
also supra note 78 (explaining why subordination is disadvantageous to senior mortgage 
holders). 
209 See supra note 81 (explaining that investors will shy away from bonds with junior 
repayment provisions because these bonds are less likely to be repaid). 
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preexisting loans in July 2010.210  Few people have taken out PACE loans 
since July 2010 due to the legal uncertainty surrounding these programs, 
so the FHFA would not have to honor many more PACE loans than it 
already offered to honor.211 
B. PACE Programs Must Adopt Stringent Underwriting and Program 
Design Requirements 
§ 10155.  Consumer underwriting and disclosure 
1.  Underwriting.  A PACE agreement entered into 
pursuant to a PACE program must comply with the 
underwriting standards of the Federal Housing Finance 
Agency.  In adopting such rules, the trust shall seek 
advice from the consumer credit industry stakeholders.  
Underwriting requirements established by the trust 
must, at a minimum, comply with the program design and 
underwriting requirements set forth in the Department of 
Energy’s Best Practices Guidelines.212 
The Model Statute incorporates, by reference, the FHFA’s very 
stringent underwriting requirements.213  This proposal satisfies the 
complaint that PACE programs lack adequate underwriting criteria.214  
One principal FHFA criterion is that no loan can subordinate preexisting 
mortgages and liens.215 
The Model Statute also incorporates, by reference, the DOE’s Best 
Practice Guidelines, which were received favorably by the mortgage 
industry.216  These guidelines require PACE programs to essentially pay 
for themselves by requiring expected benefits to exceed costs.217  They 
also require that PACE loans are not more than ten percent of the 
property’s value, which is substantially less than the percentage allowed 
                                                 
210 See supra note 44 (reporting on the FHFA’s offer to honor preexisting PACE loans). 
211 See supra note 55 (explaining that the legal uncertainty surrounding PACE programs 
has caused investors to hesitate before investing in PACE bonds). 
212 The proposed amendments are italicized and are the contribution of the author.  For 
the original text of the Maine statute, see supra note 50.  For the DOE guidelines 
incorporated in the statute, see supra Part II.B.1. 
213 See JASPER, supra note 41, at 7–8 (explaining that the FHFA imposes stringent 
guidelines for mortgages it backs). 
214 See supra Part II.A.3 (explaining that the GSEs and the mortgage industry oppose 
PACE programs because of the lack of sound underwriting standards). 
215 See supra note 44 (listing FHFA guidelines). 
216 See supra Part II.B.1 (describing the guidelines and their favorable reception in the 
mortgage industry). 
217 See supra note 50 (noting that the DOE guidelines suggest that loans only be offered 
for projects where the costs exceed the benefits). 
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in typical property assessments.218  The FHFA underwriting standards 
and DOE Guidelines have the combined effect of ensuring that PACE 
loans are only extended for appropriate projects, which reduces the risk 
of default.219 
C. States Should Allow a Third Party to Collect PACE Loan Revenues 
§ 10156. PACE mortgages; collection of PACE 
assessments; priority 
1. Collection of assessments.  PACE assessments do 
not constitute a tax or assessment but may be collected by 
the Energy Efficiency Trust (“Trust”), a municipality or an 
agent designated by the Trust or a municipality in any 
manner allowed under the PACE program, consistent 
with applicable laws. 
A. The Trust is created to provide a uniform method of 
collecting PACE loan revenues from participating 
property owners and repaying investors in PACE bonds. 
B.  The Trust will also operate a Loan Loss Reserve Fund 
to insure that subordinate PACE loans are fully repaid in 
the event of a foreclosure.  This Loan Loss Reserve Fund 
may be funded through the general funds of 
municipalities with PACE programs or from various state 
and federal grants and loans.220 
PACE supporters argue that PACE loans must have a senior lien 
provision because local governments have no other effective means of 
collecting money from the liens.221  However, another collection method 
is needed because local governments cannot make PACE loans senior to 
                                                 
218 Cf. supra note 96 (listing approved percentages ranging from twenty-five percent to 
seventy-five percent). 
219 See supra note 74 (explaining that property owners with high LTV ratios are likely to 
foreclose on their property).  The DOE guidelines help solve this problem because they 
limit the amount of debt a property owner can take on when the property owner receives a 
PACE loan.  See supra Part II.B.1 (explaining how the DOE guidelines provide this 
protection); see also supra note 41 (asserting that the FHFA requires property owners to 
meet stringent guidelines before receiving a loan to guard against the risk of foreclosure).  
Incorporating the DOE and FHFA guidelines means that only very safe PACE loans will be 
extended. 
220 The proposed amendments are italicized and are the contribution of the author.  For 
the original text of the Maine statute’s collection provision, see supra note 37. 
221 The argument is questionable because municipalities use other means such as fees to 
collect revenues for improvement projects.  See City of Gainesville v. Florida, 863 So. 2d 
138, 145 (Fla. 2003).  Nevertheless, the concern should be addressed in the Model Statute to 
ensure an acceptable compromise for all stakeholders. 
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other property interests.  The collection process should be taken out of 
the hands of local governments altogether to free up valuable municipal 
resources for other purposes. 
States should establish an Energy Efficiency Trust (“Trust”) to 
administer PACE loan collection.  This is a classic example of tax 
farming, which has become increasingly popular in recent years.222  The 
Trust also has the benefit of economies of scale—as a state-wide 
organization it is larger than a municipal collection entity and therefore 
has more resources at its disposal.223  The Trust operates a Reserve Fund 
to pay off PACE liens.  This ensures that PACE liens will be fully repaid 
even though they are junior property interests.  This insurance should 
help relieve investors’ concerns about repayment and help ensure PACE 
programs are fully funded.224 
Money for the Reserve Fund can come from the general fund of 
participating municipalities.  This means it would come from general tax 
receipts, not just from property owners who take out PACE loans, so the 
larger tax base would ensure that the Reserve Fund receive more funds.  
It might also stimulate demand for PACE loans:  all property taxpayers 
would have skin in the game because they would be funding the PACE 
insurance program and therefore might want to get a direct benefit from 
their tax dollars. 
D. PACE Loans Must Follow the “First in Time, First in Right” Principle 
§ 10156. PACE mortgages; collection of PACE 
assessments; priority 
. . . . 
3. Priority.  Except as provided in paragraph A, the 
priority of a PACE mortgage created under subsection 2 
is determined based on the date of filing of notice 
required under subsection 2 and applicable law. 
A. A PACE mortgage is not entitled to any special priority 
unless paragraph B is applicable. 
B. The PACE loan may constitute a senior lien upon the 
property on the same level as a property tax assessment only if 
the property owner agrees in writing to the payment of the 
                                                 
222 See supra note 88 (explaining the process of tax farming and its benefits to local 
governments). 
223 See supra note 99 (explaining that loan loss reserve funds achieve economies of scale). 
224 See supra note 81 (explaining that investors will not invest in bonds with junior lien 
repayment provisions, which means that PACE programs with junior lien repayment 
provisions will go unfunded). 
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PACE loan in a manner acceptable to the preexisting 
mortgage lender or lien holder.225 
Since PACE loans are merely loans for home improvements, they 
must follow the traditional “first in time, first in right” principle.226  This 
is not a departure from Maine’s statute, because Maine already requires 
PACE loans to be junior to preexisting property interests.227  It is a drastic 
change from the majority position, however, because Maine is the only 
state to require PACE loans to follow the “first in time, first in right” 
principle.228 
The Model Statute allows for a minor exception to the “first in time, 
first in right” principle because PACE loans resemble property 
assessments in some aspects.  This exception is particularly appropriate 
if states require their local governments to administer loan collection 
instead of the proposed Trust.  The exception allows PACE loans to hold 
a senior lien position, just like valid assessments, if mortgage lenders 
agree in writing to the lien seniority. 
The exception is justified because it requires the parties to negotiate 
for the lien seniority.  The mortgage lender will agree to the change only 
after receiving some bargained-for exchange.  Presumably, lenders will 
only agree to such a change in seniority if they feel confident that the 
property owners will not default on their PACE loan.  This encourages 
property owners to only take on reliable PACE programs. 
E. States Must Create a Reserve Fund to Ensure PACE Loans are Repaid 
§ 10156. PACE mortgages; collection of PACE 
assessments; priority. 
. . . . 
6.  Loan Loss Reserve Fund.  The Trust shall create a loan 
loss reserve fund to protect the trust in the event of a 
judicial sale or foreclosure of qualifying property subject 
                                                 
225 The proposed amendments are italicized and are the contribution of the author.  For 
the text of the original Maine statute, see supra note 40. 
226 See supra note 84 (explaining that the “first in time, first in right” principle is the 
general rule for lien seniority unless the lien falls within an exception to the rule).  PACE 
programs do not fall within the exception for property taxes or assessments, and therefore 
must follow the “first in time, first in right” principle.  See supra Part III.A.4 (analyzing 
PACE statutes and concluding that they do not fall within the property tax or assessment 
exception). 
227 See supra text accompanying note 40 (explaining that the Maine statute is the only 
statute with such a provision). 
228 See supra text accompanying note 38 (explaining that while some states do not specify 
the seniority of PACE loans, most states require senior lien provisions). 
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to a PACE mortgage.  The Reserve Fund is to be used to 
satisfy junior PACE liens that cannot be satisfied when a 
senior mortgage is foreclosed.  The Reserve Fund must be 
funded subject to the provisions in section 10156 1.A. at a 
level sufficient to offset past due balances on PACE 
assessments and any remaining principal balances on 
those assessments, as reasonably predicted based on 
good lending practices.229 
The Reserve Fund shall only be used for PACE loans that represent 
junior property interests.230  The Reserve Fund is not needed when the 
parties negotiate for a senior PACE lien position because the senior 
position guarantees PACE loans will be repaid.231  The Reserve Fund will 
only come into play when the PACE loan is junior to a foreclosed 
property interest, and PACE investors risk not receiving a return on their 
investment.  The Reserve Fund will also not release money if there is 
enough surplus from the foreclosure to satisfy the PACE loan. 
The Trust is also required to maintain an adequate amount of money 
in the Reserve Fund to cover all outstanding PACE loans.  This means 
that the Reserve Funds will satisfy the entire PACE loan, not just the 
amount due at the time of foreclosure.  When the property is sold to 
subsequent property owners, the property will transfer free of any 
encumbrances. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Government programs, like PACE programs, represent a serious 
effort to combat global warming and should be encouraged whenever 
possible.  However, PACE programs also have significant unintended 
consequences that could cause the United States housing market to once 
again experience the painful recession that began in 2008.232  That 
recession began in part because homeowners were using their homes as 
collateral while taking on inappropriate levels of debt.233  PACE 
                                                 
229 The proposed amendments are italicized and are the contribution of the author.  For 
examples of an existing Revolving Loan Fund statute, see supra note 37. 
230 See supra Part IV.C (discussing the proposed Reserve Fund). 
231 See supra notes 74–75 (explaining that senior liens are paid off first in foreclosure and 
junior liens are only repaid if there is a surplus after the senior liens are repaid); see also 
supra Part IV.D (explaining how the proposed statute is designed to foster negotiations 
among the parties and ultimately lead to more feasible PACE projects). 
232 See supra note 7 (explaining how PACE statutes as currently codified could risk 
repeating the mortgage meltdown of 2008). 
233 See supra note 7 (explaining that the recent recession started because of problems with 
mortgage lending policies).  Homeowners’ property became too highly leveraged and 
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programs potentially enable homeowners to take on inappropriate debt 
levels and even make that debt senior to preexisting mortgages.  PACE 
programs must be amended because of their ability to increase a 
property’s debt load and because of their interference with preexisting 
contract rights. 
To date, none of the solutions to the PACE controversy proposed by 
PACE supporters or mortgage industry groups adequately resolve the 
problem, so a new solution must be proposed.  The solution must 
require PACE loans to follow the “first in time, first in right” principle 
and provide adequate safeguards to ensure that investors get a return on 
their investment.  This solution addresses the two main competing 
concerns and would allow PACE programs to become a successful 
option for homeowners looking to reduce their greenhouse gas 
emissions.  Any other solution will, at minimum, slow the “pace” of our 
nation’s recovery. 
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